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Vulnerability and Power in the
Age of the Anthropocene
Angela P. Harris*
Abstract
Feminist legal theorist Martha Fineman has suggested
that recognition of universal human “vulnerability” should be the
starting point for thinking about the state’s obligations to its
citizens. This Article argues that Fineman’s concept of
vulnerability is valuable for situating political and legal theory
within a concern for the natural world. We live in what some
scientists have dubbed the Anthropocene—an age in which our
collective behavior has serious implications for the flourishing of
all life on earth. The concept of “ecological vulnerability”
recognizes that humans are vulnerable not only because they age,
become ill, and die, but because their survival depends on
complex macro- and micro-ecologies—all of which are, in turn,
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vulnerable to harm. Ecological vulnerability can serve as an
important conceptual bridge between critical legal theory and the
emerging “green” legal theory, helping to close the gap between
projects of social justice on one hand and environmental
sustainability on the other. Misused, however, vulnerability
analysis can make power relations, and therefore injustice,
invisible. Legal and political theorists in search of conceptual
frameworks appropriate to the Anthropocene must therefore be
careful to incorporate a robust anti-subordination principle into
their analyses as they adopt the language of ecological
vulnerability.
Admit that humans have crawled or secreted
themselves into every corner of the environment;
admit that the environment is actually inside
human bodies and minds, and then proceed
politically,
technologically,
scientifically,
in
everyday life, with careful forbearance, as you
might with unruly relatives to whom you are
inextricably bound and with whom you will engage
over a lifetime . . . .1
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I. Introduction
In a paper published in 2011, a group of scientists led by
Will Steffen presented evidence of what they called “The Great
Acceleration:” a sudden intensification of the impact of human
activity on the global environment.2 Taking the measure of
diverse human phenomena, from human population and fertilizer
consumption to the number of McDonald’s restaurants
worldwide, the authors generated a series of charts. Each chart
featured a curve sloping steeply upward, beginning around 1945.3
Extreme environmental change on planet Earth is nothing
new.4 As J.R. McNeill points out in his environmental history of
the twentieth-century world, “[a]steroids and volcanoes, among
other astronomical and geological forces, have probably produced
more radical environmental changes than we have yet witnessed
in our time.”5 Nor is human impact on the biosphere
unprecedented.6 As beings embedded in biological systems,
humans have always affected the fortunes of plant and animal
species around us (and within us, as we will see), and these
impacts increased as humans began farming, building cities, and
domesticating other animals.7 However, since the dawn of the
Industrial Age the scale of human intervention in human and
trans-human planetary systems has grown dramatically. McNeill
explains that the transition from reliance on human and animal
2.
See Will Steffen et al., The Anthropocene: Conceptual and
Historical Perspectives, 369 PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS. ROYAL. SOC’Y. A 842,
851–52 (2011) (charting different measures of human activity from 1750–2000).
3.
See id. (graphing a several categories of human behavior
indicating 1945 as a time where patterns changed).
4.
See J.R. MCNEILL, SOMETHING NEW UNDER THE SUN: AN
ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY OF THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY WORLD 3 (2000) (noting
that “[e]nvironmental change on earth is as old as the planet itself”).
5.
Id.
6.
See id. at 6 (explaining that, since humanity invented fire, it
has been polluting the air).
7.
See Steffen et al., supra note 2, at 846–47 (highlighting
agriculture as one of two pre-industrial events that presaged the Anthropocene
Era); see also MCNEILL, supra note 4, at 4 (noting that as a species, “we have cut
timber, mined ores, generated wastes, grown crops, and hunted animals for a
long time.”).
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power to reliance on fossil fuels made possible an extraordinary
growth in energy use:
We have probably deployed more energy since
1900, than in all of human history before 1900.
My very rough calculation suggests that the
world in the twentieth century used 10 times as
much energy as in the thousand years before
1900 A.D. In the 100 centuries between the dawn
of agriculture and 1900, people used only about
two-thirds as much energy as in the twentieth
century.8
Although this surge in energy use created the conditions
for dramatic population growth, longer, healthier lives for
humans all over the globe, liberation from “the drudgery of
endless muscular toil,”9 and the flowering of complex human
cultural products (including but not limited to cute cat videos),
the surge also came at least two costs. The first has been
environmental: an intensification of water, soil, and air pollution,
the loss of arable land and biodiversity, and disruptions in largescale and long-term cycles of biology, chemistry and geology as
carbon and nitrogen circulate between land, sea and
atmosphere.10 The most dramatic example of these disruptions, of
course, is global warming.11 Steffen and his co-authors argued
that these disruptions are so large that they should be
acknowledged in our measurements of geological time.12 In their
view, we should declare an end to the Holocene Era, which began
about 10,000 years ago, and recognize the beginning of the
“Anthropocene Era.”13

8.
MCNEILL, supra note 4, at 15.
9.
Id.
10.
See id. at 15–16 (stating that one of the costs of energy
intensification is the increase of pollution generated by fossil fuel combustion).
11.
See Steffen et al., supra note 2, at 842–43 (addressing the role
of climate change in the emergence of the Anthropocene).
12.
See id. at 860–62 (discussing the societal implications of
accepting the concept of the Anthropocene).
13.
See id. at 847 (arguing that the Industrial Revolution set
human beings on a path away from the Holocene Era).
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The second cost of humanity’s turn to fossil fuel energy
has been an increase in economic and political inequality. 14
McNeill observes that “fossil fuel use has sharply increased the
inequalities in wealth and power among different parts of the
world.”15 These inequalities are typically discussed in terms of a
divide between the “developed” and “developing” nations, or the
“global North” versus the “global South,” where the wealthy
countries of the “developed” North are contrasted with the poor
countries of the “developing” South.16 This divide is clearly visible
in terms of energy use. For example, McNeill notes that “The
average American in the 1990s used 50 to 100 times as much
energy as the average Bangladeshi and directed upwards of 75
energy slaves [human equivalents] while the Bangladeshi had
less than one.”17 The differential is similarly reflected in
comparative calculations of “carbon footprints,” a popular
measure of greenhouse gas production. As Katrina Fischer Kuh
notes, “The United States citizen’s Sasquatch-sized carbon
footprint of approximately twenty metric tons of carbon dioxide
dwarfs the Thumbelina-like footprint, a mere one metric ton, of
the average Indian citizen.”18 Compounding these production
inequalities, international trade relations frequently result in the

14.
See MCNEILL, supra note 4, at 15–16 (“Harnessing fossil fuels
played a central (though not exclusive) role in widening the international wealth
and power differential so conspicuous in modern history.”).
15.
Id.
16.
This conventional dichotomy has become increasingly
misleading as several nations formerly classified as “developing” have rapidly
industrialized. See Ruth Gordon, The Dawn of a New, New International
Economic Order? 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 131, 134–38 (2009) (criticizing the
terms “developed” and “developing” and substituting a tripartite categorization
of high-, middle-, and low-income nations). Most notably, China, long considered
a “developing” nation, has become not only a political and economic superpower,
but also the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitter. See Michael P.
Vandenbergh, The China Problem, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 905, 908 (2008) (discussing
the scale of China’s greenhouse gas emissions); Ruth Gordon, The
Environmental Implications of China’s Engagement with Sub-Saharan Africa,
42 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11109, 11111 (2012) (discussing China’s
political and economic strength).
17.
MCNEILL, supra note 4, at 16.
18.
Katrina Fischer Kuh, Energy and the Environment:
Empowering Consumers, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 911, 916 (2009).
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transfer of hazardous waste from the global North to the global
South.19
The divide between the global North and the global South
did not arise by accident. Rather, behind these differentials of
wealth, energy use, and pollution burden stand the long-term,
large-scale political projects we now refer to as “colonialism,”
“imperialism,” and “chattel slavery.”20 The technologies
associated with the Industrial Revolution and reliance on fossil
fuel energy over human and animal somatic energy gave
colonizing nations an edge over colonized nations, intensifying
the socioeconomic inequalities between them.21 Far from being
over and done with, the economic, environmental, and social
effects of these global relations of domination continue today.
What are the implications of the revolution in human
energy use and its twin costs—environmental degradation and
socioeconomic inequality—for legal theory? A large and
sophisticated legal literature now addresses the regulatory
implications of global climate change and other environmental
aspects of the Anthropocene era at the local, national, and
international scale, from the perspective of environmental law
and policy.22 There is also a smaller but robust and growing body
19.
Gonzalez explains:
Hazardous waste generators in the North export wastes to the South
because strict environmental regulation and citizen opposition to the
location of waste disposal facilities have increased the cost of waste
disposal in the North. By contrast, hazardous waste disposal is
significantly cheaper in the South due to weak environmental
regulation, lax enforcement, and government corruption. Moreover,
poverty and debt create powerful incentives for developing countries to
accept hazardous waste shipments from other nations in order to earn
badly needed foreign exchange. Carmen G. Gonzalez, Beyond EcoImperialism: An Environmental Justice Critique of Free Trade, 78
DENV. U. L. REV. 979, 989 (2001).
20.
See, e.g., Carmen G. Gonzalez, Markets, Monocultures, and
Malnutrition: Agricultural Trade Policy Through an Environmental Justice
Lens, 14 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 345, 357–58 (2011) (explaining how colonialism led
to “undernourishment and environmental degradation” in colonized states).
21.
See, e.g., Gonzalez, Beyond Eco-Imperialism, supra note 19, at
988–92 (describing how disposal of hazardous waste from colonizing nations
(North) to colonized nations (South) creates inequality in the South).
22.
See generally, Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and
Pleas: Limited Government in an Era of Unlimited Harm, 121 YALE L.J. 350
(2011) (examining the use of federal and state tort law to guide governments in
addressing climate change); Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Climate
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of work addressing the social implications of climate change,
including scholarship that brings together environmental law and
human rights law to consider the obligations of states to
individuals and groups whose lives have or will be disrupted by
rising seas and natural disasters.23 However, little has been
written as yet considering the implications of the Anthropocene
for critical legal theory. With a few notable exceptions, critical
legal theorists have concentrated on “social justice” and
Regulation and the Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1557
(2011) (reviewing regulations on industry and the global climate, and providing
recommendations for the use of cost-benefit analysis in the regulatory sphere);
J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The
Case of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1499, (2007) (highlighting state
regulatory action as a tool to develop federal regulations on climate change);
Kirsten Engel, State and Local Climate Change Initiatives: What Is Motivating
State and Local Governments To Address a Global Problem and What Does This
Say About Federalism and Environmental Law?, 38 URB. LAW. 1015 (2006)
(discussing state and local governments’ roles in climate change regulation);
Kirsten H. Engel & Scott R. Saleska, Subglobal Regulation of the Global
Commons: The Case of Climate Change, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 183 (2005) (advocating
for a collective, rather than unilateral, approach to climate change).
23.
See generally, Evadne Grant, Louis Jacobus Kotze & Karen L.
Morrow, Human Rights and the Environment: In Search of a New Relationship,
3 OÑATI SOCIO-LEGAL SERIES 953 (2013) (Spain), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2221302 (summarizing the discussions and themes
which emerged from the Oñati Workshop on Human Rights and the
Environment, including “vulnerability; the limits of the law; the limits of rights;
responsibility; interconnection; and thinking ecologically”) (on file with the
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL ON ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT);
Sofya Manukyan, Can the ICESCR Be an Alternative for Environmental
Protection? Analysis of the Effectiveness of the ICESCR in Holding State and
Non-State Actors Accountable for Environmental Degradation (September 10,
2013) (unpublished M.A. dissertation, University of Essex), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2364130 (exploring the use of the ICESCR as a tool to
establish environmental protection throughout the globe) (on file with the
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL ON ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT);
Timo Koivurova and Sébastien Duyck & Leena Heinämäki, Climate Change and
Human Rights, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE LAW 287 (21 IUS GENTIUM:
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON LAW AND JUSTICE), available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2336876
(Erkki J. Hollo et al. eds, 2013) (describing the relationship between human
rights and climate change) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL ON
ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT); Hari M. Osofsky, Learning from
Environmental Justice: A New Model for International Environmental Rights,
24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 71 (2005) (analyzing environmental justice litigation from
international, regional, and United States tribunals to develop an approach to
addressing environmental justice issues on an international scale).
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environmental scholars have concentrated on “sustainability,”
with few overlaps in these distinct conversations.24
This Article seeks to help bridge the gap. I argue that
feminist theorist Martha Fineman’s recent work on
“vulnerability” provides a useful means of integrating critical
legal theory and environmental scholarship. In a series of
articles, Fineman argues that law needs a theory of vulnerability
to supplement anti-subordination theory’s focus on equality
24.
A few environmentally oriented legal scholars have produced
work that could be understood as “critical environmental theory.” See, e.g.,
Michael M’Gonigle & Louise Takeda, The Liberal Limits of Environmental Law:
A Green Legal Critique, 30 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1005, 1080 (2013) (calling for a
“green legal theory”). M’Gonigle and Takeda, however, are silent on the
connections between social subordination and environmental production and
destruction. Similarly, Douglas Kysar and Mary Christina Wood have begun the
task of imagining environmental regulation that would represent a meaningful
check on growth-oriented capitalism, rather than an accommodation to it. See,
e.g., Douglas A. Kysar, Law, Environment, and Vision, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 675,
677 (2003) (advocating for the use of economics in the regulatory sphere); Mary
Christina Wood, “You Can’t Negotiate with a Beetle”: Environmental Law for a
New Ecological Age, 50 NAT. RESOURCES J. 167, 191 (2010) (“Agencies must
significantly amplify the protection of vital resources, which means that they
must strengthen their resistance to proposals for private profit that cause
ecological damage.”). For work situated within philosophy and ethics that begins
to consider the broad implications of the Anthropocene, see, e.g., Anna M. Grear,
Towards a New Horizon: in Search of a Renewing Socio-Juridical Imaginary, 3
OÑATI
SOCIO-LEGAL
SERIES
966
(2013)
(Spain),
available
at
opo.iisj.net/index.php/osls/article/viewFile/263/310 (on file with the WASHINGTON
AND LEE JOURNAL ON ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). This work,
however, similarly fails to address the subordination dimension of the economicenvironmental crisis.
A few critical legal scholars have begun to consider the implications of
global climate change for the project of equality. See, e.g., Ruth Gordon, supra
note 16. In general, however, scholars writing from an environmental justice
perspective have been the most active in developing the groundwork for a
critical legal theory of the Anthropocene that takes seriously both justice and
sustainability. For example, Carmen Gonzalez’s scholarship on food,
environment, human rights, and international trade relations connects the
present reality of environmental crisis, the ideologies and institutions of
international “development,” and the legacies of colonialism and imperialism.
See, e.g., Carmen G. Gonzalez, The Global Food System, Environmental
Protection, and Human Rights, 26 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 7 (2012); Carmen G.
Gonzalez, An Environmental Justice Critique of Comparative Advantage:
Indigenous Peoples, Trade Policy, and the Mexican Neoliberal Economic
Reforms, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 723 (2011); Gonzalez, Markets, Monoculture, and
Malnutrition, supra note 20; Gonzalez, Beyond Eco-Imperialism, supra note 19.
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among persons.25 For Fineman, the concept of vulnerability
reflects the fact that we are “born, live, and die within a fragile
materiality that renders all of us constantly susceptible to
destructive external forces and internal disintegration.” 26
Fineman further argues that recognizing human vulnerability
requires that we relinquish, or at least significantly alter, our
existing theories of the self and of the state.27 Building on
feminist and postmodern critiques of the autonomous liberal
subject, Fineman uses the concept of vulnerability to imagine a
political subject that is not only embedded in human
relationships, but is also materially and temporally fragile. 28 She
concludes that justice for beings who are made of flesh, who
sicken, age, and die, and who depend on each other for survival
requires positive obligations from the state to take care of its
25.
See Martha Albertson Fineman, “Elderly” as Vulnerable:
Rethinking the Nature of Individual and Societal Responsibility, 20 ELDER L.J.
71, 71 (2012) [hereinafter Elderly as Vulnerable] (“The vulnerability of our
embodied beings and the messy dependency that often comes in the wake of
physical or physiological needs cannot be ignored throughout any individual life
and must be central to theories about what constitutes a just and responsive
state.”); Martha Albertson Fineman, Beyond Identities: The Limits of an
Antidiscrimination Approach to Equality, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1713, 1719 (2012)
[hereinafter Beyond Identities] (“[T]he foundational difference between the
manner in which equality is understood in the United States and how it is
understood in much of the rest of the world arises from the recognition and
acceptance in other countries that human need and vulnerability are not only
an individual responsibility but also a state responsibility.”); Martha Albertson
Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 60 EMORY L.J. 251,
256 (2010) [hereinafter Responsive State] (“In this Essay I explore how the
concept of vulnerability can help us better understand how to actually realize
that often-glorified American commitment to equality of opportunity and
access.”); Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring
Equality in the Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 1 (2008)
[hereinafter Vulnerable Subject] (“The vulnerability approach I propose is an
alternative to traditional equal protection analysis . . . .”).
26.
See Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 25, at 12
(explaining the tensions explored by vulnerability).
27.
See Fineman, Beyond Identities, supra note 25, at 1752 (“My
argument is that to attain broad general opportunity and access in today’s
world, the state must be responsive to individual, social, and institutional
circumstances so that equality is anchored in the realities of the human
condition and not some abstract and unachievable ‘ideal.’”).
28.
See id. at 1752–53 (explaining that the concept of the
‘vulnerable subject’ was developed by asking questions regarding how
individuals handle the concept of the material fragility of existence).
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citizens, not just the negative obligation to refrain from intrusion
on their liberty.29
This Article argues that vulnerability theory provides a
way to situate theories of political obligation within care for the
natural world. Vulnerability has always been the reality of
human life on earth, but today, as Steffens’ charts vividly
illustrate,30 we are living in “a regime of perpetual ecological
disturbance”31 that threatens not only human life, but also all life
on the planet. The advent of the Anthropocene era requires
heightened awareness of the relationship between humans and
the environments in which they live, including a series of positive
obligations of the state vis-à-vis both humans and what we think
of as “the environment” or “nature.”32 Conceptualizing “ecological
vulnerability” can help make this relationship visible. However,
as Fineman acknowledges and I want to underscore,
vulnerability cannot and should not stand alone as the starting
place for legal and political theory.33 The language of
29.
See id. at 1760 (arguing that the responsive state will be
generative rather than destructive if it can recognize the complex relationship
between individuals and institutions, and highlighting the role the state must
play in the maintenance of that relationship).
30.
See generally Steffen et al., supra note 2 (providing several
graphs depicting the onset of the Anthropocene).
31.
MCNEILL, supra note 4, at xxiv.
32.
In this way, my argument parallels the argument of “ecological
economists,” who situate economic institutions within the natural world. See
Robert Costanza, Herman E. Daly & Joy A. Bartholomew, Goals, Agenda, and
Policy Recommendations for Ecological Economics, in ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS:
THE SCIENCE AND MANAGEMENT OF SUSTAINABILITY 5 (Robert Costanza ed., 1991)
(explaining, in Table 1.1, that Ecological Economics “[a]cknowledges [the]
interconnections between humans and the rest of nature”); HERMAN E. DALY,
BEYOND GROWTH: THE ECONOMICS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 45–51 (1996)
(explaining the “elements of environmental economics”); Kysar, Law,
Environment, and Vision, supra note 24, at 680–93 (2003) (reviewing the
emergence, tenets, and methodology of ecological economics); Douglas A. Kysar,
Sustainable Development and Private Global Governance, 83 TEX. L. REV. 2109,
2115 n. 37 (2005) (describing ecological economics as “a field that is
distinguishable from neoclassical economics based on its insistence that
questions of equity and scale should be seen as analytically prior to questions of
efficiency”).
33.
See Fineman, Responsive State, supra note 25, at 275
(“Vulnerability analysis is an attempt to articulate a more self-conscious and
aware egalitarian political culture; one that more robustly adheres to the allAmerican promise of equality of opportunity and equal access to the American
dream. It is those aspirations for substantive equality for the vulnerable subject
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vulnerability can be used to direct attention away from the social
and political roots of injury. This Article argues for a view of
ecological vulnerability that takes a commitment to the
indivisibility of humans and their environments and a
commitment to anti-subordination as valuable checks on one
another—supplements, rather than substitutes.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II.A begins with a
brief review of Fineman’s theory of vulnerability.34 In subsection
B, relying on recent efforts of economists and natural scientists to
understand and account for the macro- and micro-ecologies in
which human life is embedded, I argue that Fineman’s
descriptive account of vulnerability can be extended by
considering the human body as dependent on—indeed, perhaps
unimaginable apart from—a series of flows and interactions with
the non-human world.35 The concept of “ecological vulnerability”
helps us imagine the bearer of legal rights as a fully embodied
subject whose body is inseparable from “the environment.” In
Part III, I consider some of the implications of ecological
vulnerability for legal and political governance. Subsection A
reviews some accounts of the ecologically vulnerable subject
developed by theorists of “materiality” in the humanities.36 In
subsection B, I derive from their work two first principles for
responding to ecological vulnerability in law.37 First, the state has
a fundamental obligation of environmental protection that is
indivisible from its obligation to protect human rights (the
“indivisibility principle”). Second, a critical analysis of power is
necessary to supplement vulnerability analysis (the “antisubordination principle”). Finally, subsection C takes note of
some existing models for ecological vulnerability in policy,
politics, and law, including the policy frame of “just
sustainabilities,” the political theory and advocacy of the
environmental justice movement, and recent legal developments
in Latin America. 38 It concludes that a vulnerability analysis

that should form the ultimate ideals against which the state and its societal
institutions and their actions are judged.”).
34.
See infra Part II.A.
35.
See infra Part II.B.
36.
See infra Part III.A.
37.
See infra Part III.B.
38.
See infra Part III.C.
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requires us to recognize ecological vulnerability as part and
parcel of humans’ “fragile materiality.”

II. Toward a Theory of Ecological Vulnerability
A. Fineman and Vulnerability
Martha Fineman’s theory of vulnerability begins with the
observation that United States constitutional equality norms are
narrow compared to those of nations with more recently drafted
constitutions.39 American constitutional equality, driven by the
United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause,40 is “understood narrowly
as only the requirement of sameness of treatment between
different social classifications.”41 Even the guarantee of identical
treatment applies unevenly: some group classifications receive
strict judicial scrutiny, such as race; others, like gender, receive
intermediate scrutiny; and still others, such as poverty, are not
recognized at all as sources of constitutional violation.42
Moreover, Fineman continues, the guarantee of identical
treatment focuses on individuals, not groups, and has little to say
about group-wide disadvantage or access to opportunity
structures.43 Rights to the remediation of historic group harms,
39.
See Fineman, Responsive State, supra note 25, at 253–54
(explaining that the United States, when compared to European countries, has
ratified far fewer provisions that would improve current understanding of the
government’s role in equality).
40.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1 (“No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
41.
Fineman, Beyond Identities, supra note 25, at 1727.
42.
See id. at 1727–28 (explaining which classifications are subject
to strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis review); see
generally Julie A. Nice, Whither the Canaries: On the Exclusion of Poor People
from Equal Constitutional Protection, 60 DRAKE L. REV. 1023 (2012) (criticizing
the Supreme Court’s failure to recognize poverty as a classification meriting
heightened scrutiny).
43.
See Fineman, Beyond Identities, supra note 25, at 1728 (“[T]he
guarantee of equal protection law is understood, even for the most protected
individuals, as a prohibition against arbitrary discrimination and not as some
broader inquiry into subordination or relative disadvantage.”).
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like slavery, sit uncomfortably with the norm of identical
treatment of individuals without regard to group identity; for
example, “affirmative action” in the United States is a vexed
concept subject to political and legal attack because it violates
this norm.44
The U.S. jurisprudence of equality is also framed by “first
generation” negative human rights—rights to be let alone by the
state—rather than second- or third-generation “positive”
economic and social rights, such as rights to education, housing,
or an adequate standard of living.45 As Fineman writes,
The paramount tenet of individual liberty is that
the individual must have the autonomy to make
choices independent of state interference. This
principle informs our economic, legal, and political
theories and is indispensable to the rhetoric of
personal responsibility that pervades current
discussions about entitlement reform. What
Americans
have
instead
of
social
and
socioeconomic rights is liberty or autonomy—the
right to make choices, the right to contract.46
In American political and social life, “vulnerability” is a
stigmatized condition, characterizing certain groups—such as
children, the elderly, and the ill—that are understood as lacking
the capacity to fully exercise political and social autonomy.47 In
this conception, vulnerable populations are perceived as the
44.
See id. at 1742–43 (“[R]ecent concerns regarding reverse
discrimination and “innocent” third parties, as well as the controversy over the
use of strict scrutiny in such cases, has raised doubts about the future of
affirmative action in American jurisprudence.”).
45.
See id. at 1722–23 (“[T]here is a significant divergence between
the U.S. Constitution and roughly eighty percent of the rest of the world which
has articulated the right to have basic physical needs met through the provision
of “second-generation [human] rights” such as state guarantees of medical care
and food.”).
46.
Id. at 1747–48 (citations omitted).
47.
See id. at 1748 (“Those who cannot effectively exercise their
right to contract because they are not sufficiently capable, independent, and
autonomous actors are herded together in designated “vulnerable populations,”
a designation that functionally operates as a proxy for need and dependency and
renders those within it susceptible to monitoring and supervision.”).
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opposite of the “normal” political subject. Fineman puts the point
this way:
The very idea of vulnerable populations situates
and validates an opposite and binary ideal—a
population of autonomous, self-sufficient, and
independent liberal subjects. These liberal subjects
are conceived of as invulnerable, or, at the very
least, as expressing only a different, more
acceptable vulnerability while still successfully
achieving independence, self-sufficiency, and
autonomy. They are the taxpayers, the job creators,
the heads of households, and the pillars of the
community.48
But because all human beings are born, live, and die in
fragile bodies, “vulnerability” is the rule, not the exception.49 The
48.
Id. at 1751 (citations omitted). Vulnerability used in this
conventional way overlaps with “dependency,” a stigmatized characteristic
attributed to similar groups—single mothers, children, the poor. See id. at 1748.
As Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon observed decades ago, in American
policymaking and politics to be dependent (on the welfare state, for instance) is
considered morally suspect; the normal citizen is expected to need nothing from
the state beyond the bare minimum of protections against force and fraud. See
Nancy Fraser & Linda Gordon, A Genealogy of Dependency: Tracing a Keyword
of the U.S. Welfare State, 19 SIGNS 309, 309 (1994), available at
www.jstor.org/stable/3174801 (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF
ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). As Fineman and Fraser and Gordon
observe, of course, identifying only certain groups as vulnerable obscures the
fact that no one is invulnerable. Fineman, Beyond Identities, supra note 25, at
1750 (“This targeted-group approach to vulnerability ignores its universality
and inappropriately constructs relationships of difference and distance between
individuals and groups within society.”). Vulnerability in the sense of
dependency is also a highly negatively charged term in our society. See Fraser &
Gordon, Genealogy of Dependency, at 311 (“The term carries strong emotive and
visual associations and a powerful pejorative charge.”).
49.
As Fineman poignantly writes:
The idea of the “vulnerable subject” as the appropriate legal and
political subject arose from asking two fundamental questions: (1) What
should be the political and legal implications of the fact that we are
embodied beings, which means we are born, live, and die within a
fragile materiality that renders all of us constantly susceptible to both
internal and external forces beyond our control? (2) What accounts for
the lack of consideration given by our political, economic, and legal
systems to the messy but inescapable dependency of human nature,
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typical human moves through a “life-course,” experiencing
various forms of dependency and interdependency from birth to
death.50 The typical human is also subject to internal and
external circumstances over which she has little or no control—
both negative, such as disease, crime, and disaster, and positive,
such as being born into a wealthy family or into a privileged
racial, ethnic, or gender identity.51 These sources of vulnerability
are institutional and structural in nature, and Fineman argues
that a state committed to equality should respond to them. 52
According to Fineman, then, it is the state’s responsibility
not only to respond to individual acts of discrimination against
people on the basis of irrelevant personal characteristics over
which they have no control, but also to respond to unequal
opportunities produced by social structures and institutions. 53
For Fineman, the just state is one that valorizes “political
responsibility” as well as personal responsibility. 54 Political
responsibility “ensure[s] access to and opportunities within the
institutions that have been entrusted with generating and
allocating wealth, power, and position in a market society.”55 In

marked as it is by “bodily needs, desires, and yearnings?” Fineman,
Beyond Identities, at 1752–53.
50.
See Fineman, id. at 1753 (“[T]he concept of the vulnerable
subject is built around the idea of ‘life-course,’ reflecting a range of
developmental and social stages through which individuals are likely to pass in
the course of a normal lifespan.”).
51.
See id. (“[T]he individual will encounter a myriad of
opportunities, frustrations, challenges, and experiences during his or her life,
necessitating a wide range of expertise and capabilities.”).
52.
Fineman writes:
We are all differently situated within webs of economic and
institutional relationships that structure our options and create
opportunities. This form of difference focuses us on institutional
arrangements and makes it hard to ignore the realization that in order
to have a more robust equality-based society it will be necessary to
move beyond individual identities and discrimination as it is now
understood and adopt a more structural and institutional perspective.
Id. at 1755.
53.
See id. at 1760 (advocating for a responsive state which views
individuals and institutions as “intertwined”).
54.
See id. at 1762 (“[T]he responsive state begins and ends with
the concept of political responsibility.”).
55.
Id. Property theorist Gregory Alexander articulates a similar
set of propositions:
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place of the state of limited powers that historically shaped
American law and politics, Fineman proposes a “responsive
state:”
The responsive state views individuals and
institutions as intertwined, symbiotic, and
interdependent with each other and also with the
state and its apparatus. Institutions are shaped
through law and their operation profoundly affects
individual options, opportunities, and well-being
and the ability of the state to effectively govern.
State
responsiveness
recognizes
that
the
intertwining of the individual with the institutional
can be either generative or destructive, warranting
supervision and correction by the only entity
capable of doing so: the modern state. This state, in
turn, should be understood as a cluster of
relationships, institutions, and agencies reflecting
and shaping public norms and values through law
and policy. Those relationships include the
relationship between citizen and state, as well as
between state and institutions. In a responsive
state individuals realize that they too comprise the
state and instead of standing outside of it they
have a responsibility to see it is working effectively.
Perhaps we could call this relationship
“democracy.”56

Social structures, including distributions of [legal] rights and the
definition of the rights that go along with the ownership of property,
should be judged, at least in part, by the degree to which they foster the
participation by human beings in these objectively valuable patterns of
existence and interaction. . . .
As a matter of human dignity, every person is equally entitled to
flourish. This being so, every person must be equally entitled to those
things essential for human flourishing, i.e., the capabilities that are the
foundation of flourishing and the material resources required to
nurture those capabilities. Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation
Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 764, 768
(2009).
56.
Fineman, Beyond Identities, supra note 25, at 1760.
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B. The “Environmentally Embedded” Subject
In calling attention to infancy, old age, sickness, and
death, Fineman reminds readers that the legal subject is lodged
in and indissoluble from a human body.57 Yet, the vulnerability of
the human person is not only a product of the body’s temporal
finitude, but also of the body’s status as a living system. Even the
body of a healthy, non-disabled, adult human is dependent upon
complex interactions inside and outside the body that her mind is
seldom aware of, let alone able to control. 58 Vulnerability is thus
produced not only by human interdependency, but also the
interdependency of the human body with a complex array of
nonhuman and trans-human systems. A healthy adult human can
only be considered separate from her environment by willfully
forgetting this interdependency.
Based on these observations, postmodern and feminist
theorists of materiality, such as political theorist Jane Bennett,
argue that the conventional split between “humans” and “the
environment” is profoundly misleading.59 “The environment” is
inside each person, and human activity shapes “the
environment.”60 The body, in sickness and in health, can be seen
as a set of relationships and interactions that constantly cross the
border between self and other.61 From this perspective, political
responsibility extends not only to the social and economic
institutions that mediate our fundamental vulnerability, but also
the web of human and trans-human relationships and
institutions that enable and mediate human life on earth.62
The remainder of this Part introduces ideas developed by
ecological economists and biologists that support this expansion
57.
See Fineman, Elderly as Vulnerable, supra note 25, at 86
(explaining the inevitable physical dependence all humans face as they go
through childhood, illness, disability, and old age).
58.
See infra Part II.B.2.
59.
See JANE BENNETT, VIBRANT MATTER 111–13 (2010) (discussing
“vital materiality” theory which argues that humans are on a horizontal
ontological plane with non-humans and the environment).
60.
See id. at 111 (differentiating environmentalism from
materiality theory in that “environmentalists are sevles who live on earth, [and]
vital materialists are selves who live as earth”).
61.
See infra Part II.B.2.
62.
See infra Part II.B.1.
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of Fineman’s theory—a concept I am calling “ecological
vulnerability.” Building on these ideas, this Article suggests that
Fineman’s conception of the embodied, and therefore vulnerable,
subject should include not only awareness of the human life
course, but the recognition that in each moment of that life course
humans exist only in, and because of, complex relations of
“interbeing”63 with nonhuman and nonliving systems.

63.
The term “interbeing” has been popularized by Thich Nhat
Hanh, a Vietnamese Buddhist monk, teacher, author, poet, and peace activist.
Thich Nhat Hanh, PLUM VILLAGE, http://plumvillage.org/about/thich-nhat-hanh/
(last visited Dec. 29, 2014) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF
ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). In 1966 Hanh founded the “Order of
Interbeing” (Tiep Hien in Vietnamese) as “a community of monastics and lay
people who have committed to living their lives in accord with the Fourteen
Mindfulness Trainings, a distillation of the Bodhisattva (Enlightened Being)
teachings of Mahayana Buddhism.” Order of Interbeing, PLUM VILLAGE,
http://plumvillage.org/about/order-of-interbeing/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2014) (on
file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT). Hanh offers this example to explain the term:
If you are a poet, you will see clearly that there is a cloud
floating in this sheet of paper. Without a cloud, there will be
no rain; without rain, the trees cannot grow; and without
trees, we cannot make paper. The cloud is essential for the
paper to exist. . . . So we can say that the cloud and the
paper inter-are.
If we look into this sheet of paper even more deeply, we can
see the sunshine in it. If the sunshine is not there, the forest
cannot grow. . . . And if we continue to look, we can see the
logger who cut the tree and brought it to the mill to be
transformed into paper. And we see the wheat. We know
that the logger cannot exist without his daily bread, and
therefore that the wheat that became his bread is also in
this sheet of paper . . . . The fact is that this sheet of paper
is also made up of “non-paper elements.” . . . As thin as this
sheet of paper is, it contains everything in the universe in it.
THICH NHAT HANH, ESSENTIAL WRITINGS 55–56 (Robert
Ellsberg ed., 2001).
The term “interbeing” is also associated with a fundamental Buddhist
concept, translated as “dependent origination” or “dependent co-arising.”
Religious scholar David L. McMahan explains that as an empirical description,
dependent origination “represents the world as a vast, interconnected web of
internally related beings—that is, whose identity is not a priori independent of
the systems they are a part of but is inseparable from those systems.” DAVID L.
MCMAHAN, THE MAKING OF BUDDHIST MODERNISM 150 (2008).
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1. “Outside Ecologies:” Macro-Level Vulnerability
At a macro-level of scale, all human life is engaged with,
and depends on, both the ecological “web of life” and oceanic and
atmospheric systems that provide living beings with “natural
services.” Recognition of human dependence on these
relationships extends our understanding of what it means to be
individually and collectively vulnerable.
Support for this view can be found in recent policy and
theoretical efforts to develop assessment systems for quantifying
ecosystem processes. For example, in 2000 then-United Nations
Secretary General Kofi Annan called for an international project
known as the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA), which
involved the work of more than 1,360 experts from 95 countries. 64
Carried out between 2001 and 2005, the objective of the MA was
“to assess the consequences of ecosystem change for human wellbeing and the scientific basis for action needed to enhance the
conservation and sustainable use of those systems and their
contribution to human well-being.”65 Similar to the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,66 the MA
assembled and synthesized already-existing research and data;
its purpose was to assist policymaking regarding environmental
international conventions.67
64.
See MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, ECOSYSTEMS AND
HUMAN WELL-BEING: SYNTHESIS, at ii, vii (2005), available at
www.millenniumassessment.org/documents/document.356.aspx.pdf (providing
background for the inception of and contributions to the MA).
65.
See id. at v (stating the purpose of the assessment and the
years it took place); see also Gretchen C. Daily, Introduction: What Are
Ecosystem Services?, in NATURE'S SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL
ECOSYSTEMS 3 (Gretchen C. Daily ed., 1997) (defining and explaining the
concept of ecosystem services).
66.
See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, History,
INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL
ON
CLIMATE
CHANGE:
ORGANIZATION,
https://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization_history.shtml (last visited July
31, 2014) (“The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change was created in
1988. It was set up by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the
United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) to prepare, based on available
scientific information, assessments on all aspects of climate change and its
impacts, with a view of formulating realistic response strategies.”) (on file with
the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
67.
See MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, supra note 64, at v
(“The MA did not aim to generate new primary knowledge, but instead sought to
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In its synthesis report, the MA defined an ecosystem as “a
dynamic complex of plant, animal, and microorganism
communities and the nonliving environment interacting as a
functional unit,” and defined “ecosystem services” as “the benefits
people obtain from ecosystems.”68 The MA identifies four types of
ecosystem services: (1) provisioning services, which include food,
water, timber and fiber, (2) regulating services, such as the
regulation of climate, floods and waste treatment, (3) cultural
services, such as recreation and aesthetic enjoyment, and (4)
supporting services such as soil formation, pollination and
nutrient cycling. 69
An important impetus for the MA’s project was to
intervene in economic policymaking and economic theory. 70
Under conventional neoclassical economics, ecosystem services
were undervalued or not valued at all. 71 In the second half of the
twentieth century, however, certain sub-disciplines of economic
theory, including “environmental economics” and “ecological
economics,” began attempting to identify and value ecosystem
services.72 Although the two sub-fields differ in their qualitative
framework, both environmental economics and ecological
economics “overlap in the use of specific techniques to measure

add value to existing information by collating, evaluating, summarizing,
interpreting, and communicating it in a useful form.”).
68.
See id. (defining ecosystem and ecosystem services).
69.
See id. (distinguishing the four types of ecosystem services).
70.
See id. (stating that the MA was focused on the exploration of
policy questions).
71.
See e.g. Erik Gomez-Baggethun, Rudolf de Groot, Pedro L.
Lomas & Carlos Montes, The History of Ecosystem Services in Economic Theory
and Practice: From Early Notions to Markets and Payment Schemes, 69
ECOLOGICAL ECON., Nov. 3, 2009, at 4 (explaining a statement made by
economist Robert Solow that capital could substitute for land, so that scarcity of
land need not be figured into economic calculations: “The world can, in effect,
get along without natural resources, so exhaustion is just an event, not a
catastrophe”).
72.
See Maureen L. Cropper & Wallace E. Oates, Environmental
Economics: A Survey, 30 J. OF ECON. LITERATURE 675, 675 (1992) (describing
how economists responded to the “environmental revolution” of the 1960’s,
resulting in the emergence of environmental economics); see also Costanza,
supra note 32, at 3 (“Ecological economics is a new transdisciplinary field of
study that addresses the relationships between ecosystems and economic
systems in the broadest sense.”).
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sustainability, evaluate policies and assist decision-making.”73
The goal of both is to make economic analysis more consistent
with the physical world it describes, both in the service of
accurate science and in the service of better policymaking. 74
Without recognition of the resources provided by the natural
world and their limits, the devotion of conventional economic
policymaking to endless growth threatens life on the planet.75
As an example, the ecosystem services provided by or
facilitated by water are perhaps not well understood by most
humans, yet are necessary to our continued existence. Marcia
Stanton explains:
Healthy aquatic ecosystems depend on water
quality, flow and adequate temperature so as to
maintain their capacity to provide services. Once
these needs are met, they provide several services
such as climate and hydrological regulation;
nutrient distribution and primary production;
sheltering, breeding, and habitat for many species;
waste dilution and detoxification, prevention from
soil erosion and siltation, and a buffer against
natural hazards.76
Although schemes for monetizing ecosystem services have
been criticized, and arguments continue about the particular
prices or values that should be placed on various services, it is not
73.
See Gomez-Baggethun, supra note 71, at 4. These authors, a
group of ecological economists, explain the difference as follows:
Environmental Economics operates mainly within the axiomatic
framework of Neoclassical Economics – e.g. theory of consumer choice,
perfect information, and marginal productivity theory of distribution.
Ecological Economics challenges some of these assumptions and
conceptualizes the economic system as an open subsystem of the
ecosphere exchanging energy, materials and waste flows with the social
and ecological systems with which it co-evolves. Id. (citations omitted).
74.
See id. at 6 (explaining the impact on science and on
policymaking).
75.
See id. at 4–5 (challenging models of economic growth in which
natural resources are absent).
76.
Marcia Silva Stanton, Payments for Freshwater Ecosystems
Services: A Framework for Analysis, 18 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
189, 219 (2012).
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disputed that human life and health depends on the integrity of
these services.77 As the MA synthesis report puts it, “people are
integral parts of ecosystems and . . . a dynamic interaction exists
between them and other parts of ecosystems, with the changing
human condition driving, both directly and indirectly, changes in
ecosystems and thereby causing changes in human well-being.”78
The report concludes, “The human species, while buffered against
environmental changes by culture and technology, is
fundamentally dependent on the flow of ecosystem services.”79
The effort to describe these services and quantify them in
precise economic terms is itself a “vulnerability” project: an effort
to make human vulnerability visible within conventional
economics. As Douglas Kysar puts it, “ecological economists view
the human economy as a subsystem of the environment, while
conventional economists view the environment as a subsystem of
the economy.”80 From an ecological economist’s perspective, the
conventional view assumes human invulnerability, creating the
risk that unending economic growth will eventually threaten the
carrying capacity of the earth.81 Ecological economics, and
projects such as measurements of and payments for ecological
services, attempt instead to recognize the natural limits of
human markets.82
77.
See Daily, supra note 65, at 3–5 (analogizing colonizing the
moon to highlight the necessity of viable ecosystem services).
78.
See MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, supra note 64, at v.
The MEA identifies human well-being as containing multiple constituents,
including “the basic material for a good life, such as secure and adequate
livelihoods, enough food at all times, shelter, clothing, and access to goods;
health, including feeling well and having a healthy physical environment, such
as clean air and access to clean water; good social relations, including social
cohesion, mutual respect, and the ability to help others and provide for children;
security, including secure access to natural and other resources, personal safety,
and security from natural and human-made disasters; and freedom of choice and
action, including the opportunity to achieve what an individual values doing and
being.” Id.
79.
ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: CURRENT STATE AND
TRENDS, in 1 MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, at vii (Rashid M. Hassan et
al. eds., 2005).
80.
Kysar, Law, Environment, and Vision, supra note 24, at 728.
81.
See id. at 676 (arguing that mainstream economics fails to
fully recognize the limits of the environment, and therefore fails to provide a
sound basis for policymaking).
82.
See id. at 677 (“Significantly, ecological economists rely on a
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Global climate change represents the most dramatic
example of this indivisibility of humans and “the environment.”
For instance, in its Fifth Assessment Synthesis Report, released
in 2014, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
underscored the close interrelationship between greenhouse gas
emissions, large-scale ecosystem and trans-human system
disruptions, and human life and health.83 In this report, the IPCC
stated with “high confidence” that global warming is
anthropogenic—that is, caused by human activity.84 Moreover,
according to the IPCC the physical effects of global warming now
threaten human life and human institutions. Summarizing
recent changes in atmospheric and oceanic systems as well as
taking note of species extinctions, the IPCC identified threats to
food production and to water availability and supply as two
specific examples of increased human vulnerability caused by
global climate change.85 The IPCC report predicts, with a high
degree of confidence, increases in human ill-health for the
remainder of the twenty-first century.86 In the longer term, the
report predicts—again with a high level of confidence—that
“[w]ithout additional mitigation efforts beyond those in place
today, and even with adaptation, warming by the end of the 21st
preanalytic vision of human activity that is presumed to be bounded by natural
constraints.”).
83.
SEE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE
CHANGE 2014 SYNTHESIS REPORT: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 15–16 (Rajendra
K. Pachauri et al. eds., 2014), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessmentreport/ar5/syr/SYR_AR5_SPMcorr1.pdf (reporting the predicted effects of
climate change on urban and rural areas as well as its effects on economies and
poverty) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE,
AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
84.
Id. at 4 (“Anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions have
increased since the pre-industrial era, driven largely by economic and
population growth, and are now higher than ever. This has led to atmospheric
concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide that are
unprecedented in at least the last 800,000 years. Their effects, together with
those of other anthropogenic drivers, have been detected throughout the climate
system and are extremely likely to have been the dominant cause of the
observed warming since the mid-20th century.”).
85.
See id. at 15–16 (listing the predicted effects of climate change
on various human populations).
86.
See id. at 15 (expecting with “high confidence” that
“[t]hroughout the 21st century, climate change is expected to lead to increases
in ill-health in many regions).
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century will lead to high to very high risk of severe, widespread,
and irreversible impacts globally.”87 This assessment supports
the conclusion that as a species, humanity’s fate is tied up with
that of “the environment,” and that to attempt to promote human
flourishing without regard to ecosystem functioning would be a
grave mistake in the Anthropocene era.
Finally, the IPCC report recognizes that political and social
relationships and institutions mediate the effects of global
climate change, and that the projects of mitigation and
adaptation raise issues of equity, justice, and fairness.88 We will
return to this point below.

2. “Inside Ecologies:” Micro-Level Vulnerability
The trans-human nature of the embodied self, and the
vulnerability that it entails, extends not only into the macrorealm of ecosystems but also into the micro-realm of human
biology. It is, of course, obvious that human beings are in
constant interaction with their environments.89 Recent
87.
Id. at 18. For example, the report identifies five “Reasons For
Concern” (RFCs), defined as “aggregate climate change risks” that “illustrate
the implications of warming and of adaptation limits for people, economies, and
ecosystems across sectors and regions.” Id. These RFCs are associated with: “(1)
[u]nique and threatened systems, (2) [e]xtreme weather events, (3) [d]istribution
of impacts, (4) [g]lobal aggregate impacts, and (5) [l]arge-scale singular events.”
Id. Each RFC is an example of human vulnerability in the face of continued
global warming.
88.
See id. at 17 (explaining how equity, justice, and fairness
should be included in developing mitigation strategies).
89.
As Bonnie Spanier puts it:
[O]rganisms do not exist apart from their environs or from
other organisms. Not only are organisms surrounded by and
embedded in a dynamic interaction with their environs—and in
that sense are contiguous with it—but we are contiguous with
the environment from the inside as well, whether through our
digestive and respiratory tracts, our skin pores, or the network
of endoplasmic reticulum throughout the cytoplasm of many
types of cells. . . . A very different psychology of self and other
would understand our beings as open to and connected with the
environment around us through our external and internal
surfaces, as well as what we project of ourselves (our
exhalations, body head radiation, wastes, etc.).
BONNIE B. SPANIER, IMPARTIAL SCIENCE: GENDER IDEOLOGY
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developments in microbiology, however, reveal in startling detail
that each individual human body can be understood as a complex
ecosystem made up of interdependent living entities, and that the
whole’s survival and flourishing depends on the health of the
individual parts and their interrelations.90
The Human Microbiome Project (hereafter HMP), a multinational scientific endeavor building on the Human Genome
Project, is on the cutting edge of this research.91 For example,
HMP scientists have discovered approximately 100 trillion “good
bacteria” that live in and on each human body.92 This human
“microbiome” performs a number of important services, including
food digestion, synthesis of vitamins, and protection against
disease-causing bacteria.93 Malfunctions in the microbiome,
BIOLOGY 89 (1995). Richard Lewontin concurs: “[O]rganisms do not simply use
resources present in the environment but, through their life activities, produce
such resources and manufacture their environments.” Richard Lewontin, It’s
Even Less in Your Genes, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS (May 26, 2011),
available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/may/26/its-evenless-your-genes/ (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY,
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). According to Lewontin, this view is shared by
renowned scientist Evelyn Fox Keller. In a review of her book, The Mirage of a
Space Between Nature and Nurture, Lewontin describes Keller’s titular mirage
as “our false division of the world into living objects without sufficient
consideration of the external milieu in which they are embedded, since
organisms help create effective environments through their own life activities.”
Id.
90.
See generally Peter J. Turnbaugh et al., The Human
Microbiome Project: Exploring the Microbial Part of Ourselves in a Changing
World, 449 NATURE 804 (Oct 18, 2007) (outlining “a strategy to understand the
microbial components of the human genetic and metabolic landscape).
91.
See David A. Relman, Microbiology: Learning About Who We
Are, 486 NATURE 194, 194 (Jun. 14, 2012) (listing efforts in various countries to
study the human microbiome); see also Turnbaugh et al., supra note 90, at 804
(“The HMP is not a single project. It is an inter-disciplinary effort consisting of
multiple projects, which are now being launched concurrently worldwide,
including in the United States (as part of the next phase of the National
Institutes of Health’s Roadmap for Medical Research), Europe and Asia.”).
92.
See Gina Kolata, In Good Health? Thank your 100 Trillion
Bacteria,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
13,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/14/health/human-microbiome-project-decodesour-100-trillion-good-bacteria.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (explaining the work
and findings of the Human Microbiome Project) (on file with the WASHINGTON
AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
93.
See id. (explaining the role of microbes in the human body). It
appears that there are distinct communities of microbes that live in sites such
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including disturbances caused by antibiotics, are now being
linked to maladies such as metabolic syndrome (a precursor of
Type II diabetes), obesity, and some infections.94
More broadly, the HMP’s research has prompted a
rethinking of how scientists define the human body. As one group
of researchers associated with the HMP explains:
[M]any were surprised and perhaps humbled by the
announcement that the human genome contains
only ~20,000 protein-coding genes, not much
different from the fruitfly genome. However, if the
view of what constitutes a human is extended, then
it is clear that 100,000 genes is probably an underestimate. The microorganisms that live inside and
on humans (known as the microbiota) are estimated
to outnumber human somatic and germ cells by a
factor of ten. Together, the genomes of these
microbial symbionts (collectively defined as the
microbiome) provide traits that humans did not need
to evolve on their own. If humans are thought of as a
composite of microbial and human cells, the human
genetic landscape as an aggregate of the genes in the
human genome and the microbiome, and human
metabolic features as a blend of human and
microbial traits, then the picture that emerges is one
of a human ‘supra-organism.’95
The journalist Michael Pollan puts it this way:
It turns out that we are only 10 percent human: for
every human cell that is intrinsic to our body, there
are about 10 resident microbes—including
as the skin, in the gut, and in the vagina, and that there is surprising diversity
among individuals in the composition of these microbial populations. See
generally, THE HUMAN MICROBIOME PROJECT CONSORTIUM, Structure, Function,
and Diversity of the Healthy Human Microbiome, 486 NATURE 207, 207 (June
14, 2012) (setting out results of the “largest cohort and set of distinct, clinically
relevant body habitats so far”).
94.
See Kolata, supra note 92 (discussing how essential these
bacteria are to human health and functioning).
95.
Turnbaugh et al., supra note 90, at 804 (citations omitted).
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commensals (generally harmless freeloaders) and
mutualists (favor traders) and, in only a tiny
number of cases, pathogens. To the extent that we
are bearers of genetic information, more than 99
percent of it is microbial.96

As a consequence of this discovery, “[h]uman health
should now ‘be thought of as a collective property of the humanassociated microbiota,’ as one group of researchers recently
concluded in a landmark review article on microbial ecology—
that is, as a function of the community, not the individual.” 97
Microbiologists have borrowed terms and concepts from ecology in
order to express this new understanding of the human being as a
collective. For instance, one article asserts that “each person can
be viewed as an island-like ‘patch’ of habitat occupied by
microbial assemblages formed by the fundamental processes of
community ecology: dispersal, local diversification, environmental
selection, and ecological drift.” 98 Pollan quotes Justin
Sonnenburg, a microbiologist at Stanford University, who even
suggests that “we would do well to begin regarding the human
body as ‘an elaborate vessel optimized for the growth and spread
of our microbial inhabitants.’”99 From the perspective of research
on the microbial biome, humans and microbes are
interdependent, forming complex systems that defy the
conventional understanding of human beings are distinct and

96.
Michael Pollan, Some of My Best Friends Are Germs, N.Y.
TIMES, May 15, 2013, .http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/19/magazine/say-helloto-the-100-trillion-bacteria-that-make-up-yourmicrobiome.html?pagewanted=all (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE
JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
97.
See id. (citing Courtney J. Robinson, Brendan J.M. Bohannan
& Vincent B. Young, From Structure to Function: the Ecology of Host-Associated
Microbial Communities, 74 MICROBIAL AND MOLECULAR BIOLOGY REV. 453
(2010)).
98.
Elizabeth K. Costello et al., The Application of Ecological
Theory Toward an Understanding of the Human Microbiome, 336 SCIENCE 1255,
1255
(June
2013),
available
at
www.sciencemag.org/content/336/6086/1255.full.pdf
(on
file
with
the
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
99.
Pollan, supra note 96.

VULNERABILITY AND POWER

125

independent living entities.100 “The” embodied self is not singular
at all, but rather a community of co-evolving species. 101
One implication of this framing of the human being as a
collective or an ecosystem is a new appreciation of human
vulnerability.102 Commenting on several recent studies, David A.
Relman writes, “We are essentially blind to many of the services
that our microbial ecosystems provide—and on which our health
depends—and investigators desperately need new approaches for
studying interactions between members of the microbial
community and their human hosts.”103 One area of concern is the
widespread use of antibiotics in the Western world, not only to
treat diseases but as a preventive measure in industrial
agriculture and in a wide range of domestic consumer uses. 104
Another ongoing area of research is the extent to which childhood
exposure to microbes protects health, by preventing the
development of allergies and possibly other autoimmune
disorders.105 Meanwhile, Pollan reports, “[a] handful of
100.
See id. (arguing that human health should be considered “as a
function of the community, not the individual”).
101.
See id., (explaining that the human immune system must
“learn to consider our mutualists—e.g., resident bacteria—as self too”) (quoting
Michael Fischbach).
102.
See Sabrina Tavernise, Antibiotics in Animals Tied to Risk of
Human
Infection,
N.Y.
TIMES
(January
28,
2014),
www.nytimes.com/2014/01/28/science/antibiotics-in-animals-tied-to-risk-ofhuman-infection.html (discussing the unforeseen consequences for human
health from giving antibiotics to livestock) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND
LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
103.
Relman, supra note 91, at 195 (citations omitted).
104.
See, e.g., Tavernise, supra note 102; Sabrina Tavernise, F.D.A.
Restricts Antibiotics Use for Livestock, N.Y. TIMES, December 11, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/12/health/fda-to-phase-out-use-of-someantibiotics-in-animals-raised-for-meat.html?pagewanted=all (on file with the
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT);
Sabrina Tavernise, F.D.A. Questions Safety of Antibacterial Soaps, N.Y. TIMES
(December 16, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/17/health/fda-to-requireproof-that-antibacterial-soaps-are-safe.html (on file with the WASHINGTON AND
LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
105.
See, e.g., Jane E. Brody, Eating Dirt Can Be Good For You –
Just
Ask
Babies,
N.Y.
TIMES
(January
27,
2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/27/health/27ihtsnbabies.1.19711937.html?pagewanted=all (on file with the WASHINGTON AND
LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT); Anahad O’Connor,
Sucking Your Child’s Pacifier Clean May Have Benefits, N.Y. TIMES (May 6,
2013),
http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/05/06/why-dirty-pacifiers-may-be-
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microbiologists have begun sounding the alarm about our
civilization’s unwitting destruction of the human microbiome and
its consequences. Important microbial species may have already
gone extinct, before we have had a chance to learn who they are
or what they do.”106 The microbial interchanges between human
beings and nonhuman entities and environments make visible
the extent to which human existence is an emergent property,
made possible only through complex trans-human processes that
make us vulnerable in ways we do not even yet fully understand.
C. Summary: Ecological Vulnerability
Just as the feminist “dependency critique”107 refocused
attention from the autonomy of adult individuals to the webs of
social dependency and interdependency that sustain the rightsbearing subject, recent developments in economics and the
natural sciences require us to reject the idea of an autonomous
political subject separate and distinct from an inert
“environment.”108 Humans are dependent not only on one another
but on a series of trans-human systems, and this interdependence
is a source of resilience—and vulnerability.109
Recognizing that human beings are born, age, sicken, and
die is the first step to recognizing that theories of political
existence and obligation must take account of the natural world.
If the state is to be fully responsive to all the conditions beyond
the individual’s control that affect his or her ability to flourish, as
Fineman suggests, then it must take into account the internal
your-childs-friend/ (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY,
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
106.
Pollan, supra note 96.
107.
See EVA FEDER KITTAY, LOVE’S LABOR: ESSAYS ON WOMEN,
EQUALITY, AND DEPENDENCY 18 (1999) (noting the source of the phrase
“dependency critique” and describing the it as an effort to enlarge our
conception of equality to include the “values and virtues of care”).
108.
See BENNETT, supra note 1, at 110–12 (questioning whether the
belief that the environment is responsive to human actions is the most effective
way to understand the relationship between humans and non-humans).
109.
See id. at 116 (“It is futile to seek a pure nature unpolluted by
humanity, and it is foolish to define the self as something purely human. . . A
vital materialism . . . recasts the self in the light of its intrinsically polluted
nature and in so doing recasts what counts as self-interest.”).
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and external ecologies in which humans are situated. “Ecological
vulnerability” recognizes that human lives are part of complex
ecosystems that operate on various levels of scale, from the local
to the global. Particularly in the age of the Anthropocene, when
human activity is rapidly causing large-scale, not fully
predictable, and potentially irreversible changes to our inner and
outer environments, the fully responsive state should recognize
that soil degradation, water scarcity, warming oceans, and
depleted fishing stocks structure our options and create
opportunities just as market and family relations do. In the age of
the Anthropocene, it can no longer be argued that these
environmental processes and events are outside the circle of
justice. “Human behavior” and “the natural world” are now
locked in an ever-tightening feedback loop. To care for its citizens,
the responsive state must care for the systems that make its
citizens’ flourishing possible.
Advances in microbiology as well as ecological economics
underscore the recognition of interdependency on which
ecological vulnerability analysis rests. As the previous section
outlined, humans depend on complex but as-yet poorly
understood microbial ecosystems for life and health. To fully
respond to embodied humans who, among other things, fall ill
and die, the responsive state must pay attention to the processes
that sustain and threaten its citizens’ bodies. Moreover, just as
the health of macro-ecosystems is closely tied to the operation of
human institutions, especially economic institutions, so the
health of our micro-ecologies is affected by human behavior,
including the practices of industrial agriculture.110 The feedback
loops in which humans are embedded in the microbial world must
be reflected in feedback loops of governance.
Ecological vulnerability recognizes that the responsive
state’s political obligations entail obligations to nonhuman
entities and processes. Taking the full measure of human
vulnerability means recognizing the “interbeing” of humanity
with nonhuman and trans-human systems and entities.
Ecological vulnerability thus expands our concept of what it
means to be a citizen.

110.
See supra note 102, 104 and 105 and accompanying text
(sources discussing the role of antibiotics in disrupting human microbiomes).
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III. Some Governance Implications of Ecological
Vulnerability
As Part II argued, ecological economists, climate
scientists, and microbiologists have begun to increasingly
appreciate the fragile materiality of human existence. Not only is
each human being “embodied” in a life course, subject to growth,
aging, illness, and death; embodiment entails enmeshment in
complex trans-human systems on macro- and micro-levels that
are essential to human survival and flourishing. What are the
implications for political and legal theory of reframing the rightsbearing self and the state in this way?
A number of scholars from various fields that take
embodiment seriously—including feminist theory, materialist
theory, political theory, environmental humanities, and public
health—explore the political implications of the idea that
“humans” and “the environment” are not separate and distinct,
and that “the environment” is not an inert space in which
humans exercise agency.111 The new theories of materiality and
embodiment described in subsection A of this Part rewrite the
imaginary “state of nature” that the classic liberal political
philosophers—including Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and JeanJacques Rousseau—used as their backdrop for imagining the
social contract. New theories of materialism and the body treat
the “state of nature” as a dynamic flux of human and nonhuman
relations.112 From this reimagined state of nature might emerge a
“natural contract” within which the social contract is embedded—
not to mention, as one of the wilder theoretical visions has it, a
“viscous porosity” beyond the reach of conventional politics,
where “[w]ord, flesh, and dirt are no longer discrete.”113
Building on this literature, subsection B sets out two
foundational principles or commitments that might guide
political and legal thought under an ecological vulnerability
111.
See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
112.
See BENNETT, supra note 1, at x (introducing the importance of
nonhumans interacting with humans).
113.
STACY ALAIMO, BODILY NATURES: SCIENCE, ENVIRONMENT, AND
THE MATERIAL SELF 14 (2010) (citing Nancy Tuana, Viscous Porosity: Witnessing
Hurricane Katrina, in MATERIAL FEMINISMS 188 (Stacy Alaimo & Susan
Henkman eds., 2007)).
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framework. The first is the principle that environmental
protection and the protection of human rights are inextricably
intertwined. The second is a principle that we might name simply
“humility,” but which appears in the critical literature as the
anti-subordination principle. These two principles, I suggest,
ought to be considered central to a legal theory of ecological
vulnerability.
To fully flesh out how these two principles might be
reflected in legal doctrine is beyond the scope of this Article. In
Subsection C, however, I identify some models for this project,
already visible in the literature of “just sustainabilities,” in the
work of the environmental justice movement, and in recent legal
developments in Latin America.

A. Theories of Materiality: Reenvisioning the “State of
Nature”
In the last decade of the twentieth century and into the
first decade of the twenty-first, social theorists in a number of
disciplines began to chafe against the assumption that everything
important to human relations is “socially constructed.”114 A new
literature, described as the “materialist turn,” has emerged
asserting a role for the non-human and the trans-human in social
relations and institutions. 115
The “social construction thesis” originally arose as a way
to counter the claim that social hierarchies of race, gender,
disability and sexuality are the result of “nature” and therefore
are unchangeable and nonpolitical.116 For example, critical race
theorists argue vigorously that humans are not divided into races
the way animals are divided into species; that the physical
differences people associate with “race” are matters of convention
and do not represent an underlying biological reality; and that
114.
See infra notes 116–19 and accompanying text.
115.
See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
116.
See Ron Mallon, A Field Guide to Social Construction, 2 PHIL.
COMPASS 94, 102 (2007) (“Talk of social constructions has been a provocative, if
sometimes confusing, spur to consider historical, cultural, and personal details
that shape our theories, our social worlds, and ourselves.”); see also IAN
HACKING, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF WHAT? 6 (1999) (explaining that
“[s]ocial construction work is critical of the status quo. Social constructionists of
X tend to hold that: (1) X need not have existed, or need not be at all as it is.”).
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who counts as a “white person,” a “black person,” or an “Asian”
person is determined primarily by history and politics rather
than science.117
The social construction thesis has not only been the basis
for theoretical challenges to white supremacy and male
domination, but also a powerful springboard for social action on
behalf of equality.118 Over time, however, the claim that a thing
was “socially constructed” became practically a reflex in some

117.
See Mallon, supra note 116 at 97 (discussing how constructive
theory argues that human attributes like race are defined through social
interactions, rather than being innate characteristics of humans). Critical race
theorists in law, for instance, argue that legal institutions help determine what
“race” means. See generally IAN HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL
CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1997) (showing how the Supreme Court’s interpretation
of the federal naturalization laws helped determine which individuals and
groups were deemed “white” in American history); ARIELA J. GROSS, WHAT
BLOOD WON’T TELL: A HISTORY OF RACE ON TRIAL IN AMERICA (2008) (arguing that
courtroom trials to determine the race of an individual have often turned more
on that individual’s social ties and self-presentation than on ancestry and
appearance).
One of the most extensive applications of the social construction thesis
is its use to support women’s equality. See HACKING, supra note 116, at 7 (“One
core idea of early gender theorists was that biological differences between the
sexes do not determine gender, gender attributes, or gender relations. Before
feminists began their work, this was far from obvious.”).
118.
To take a recent example, the social construction thesis has
been used in the context of disability rights to counter the notion that
“handicapped” people are naturally unable to participate in mainstream society.
As Michael Ashley Stein and Penelope J.S. Stein explain, disability rights
advocates have adopted a “social model” of disability rather than the medical
model. See Michael Ashley Stein & Penelope J.S. Stein, Beyond Disability Civil
Rights, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 1203, 1203 (2007). Under the social model of disability,
disability arises through a combination of natural capacities and institutional
arrangements. See id. at 1206–07. The equality principle requires that the state
rectify institutional arrangements that impede the full participation of
“disabled” people in social and political activities. See id. at 1205–06. This model
has had important legal and policy implications; as they note, the landmark
federal Americans with Disabilities Act “was premised on the social model's
belief that peoples’ functional limitations are caused by the socially constructed
environment, such that the repercussions of having a disability are mutable.”
Id. at 1209. Stein notes that this social constructionist model of disability built
on theories of social construction that similarly framed race and gender as
“socially constructed” rather than “natural” categories of existence. See Michael
Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Accommodations as
Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 604 (2004).

VULNERABILITY AND POWER

131

academic quarters.119 The “materialist turn” in the humanities
emerged as a challenge to this reflex. Materialist scholars
acknowledge that not everything is socially constructed. They are
interested in what lies beyond human institutions, perceptions,
concepts, and decisions, including nonhuman actors and
processes and the relationships between humans and
nonhumans.120
119.
Ian Hacking, for instance, was able to fill an entire page with
book titles that included the term “social construction.” See HACKING, supra note
116, at 1. Hacking comments, “Talk of social construction has become common
coin, valuable for political activists and familiar to anyone who comes across
current debates about race, gender, culture, or science.” Id. at 2.
120.
One important thread of the materialist turn comes through
feminist theory. Feminist theorists initially divided “gender” from “sex” as a way
of supporting the argument that conventional sex roles are not biologically but
rather politically, historically, and socially determined. See Nancy Tuana,
Fleshing Gender, Sexing the Body: Refiguring the Sex/Gender Distinction, 35 S.
J. OF PHIL. 53, 54–55 (1996) (quoting ANNE MINAS, GENDER BASICS: FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVES ON WOMEN AND MEN 4 (1993)). In this distinction, “sex”
represented what was given by nature and “gender” what was culturally
negotiated, and the feminist argument was that “gender” was much more
significant than most people assumed. Id. Introducing the notion of gender
marked the issue of women’s capacities as political, not simply a matter for
scientific experts. Id. However, the sex-gender binary was also problematic, both
because of its instability (where does one draw the line between culture and
biology?), and because it left the (natural) body outside feminism. Id. at 55.
Feminist theorists like Elizabeth Grosz began to reject the distinction altogether
and to claim “the body” as an object that belonged neither to nature nor to
culture, but equally to both. ELIZABETH GROSZ, VOLATILE BODIES: TOWARD A
CORPOREAL FEMINISM 23 (1994). Grosz, for example, described the body as a
“threshold or borderline concept that hovers perilously and undecidably at the
pivotal point of binary pairs. The body is neither—while also being both—the
private or the public, self or other, natural or cultural, psychical or social,
instinctive or learned, genetically or environmentally determined.” Id. By the
2000s, a number of feminists had joined Grosz and called for “material
feminisms.” See generally, MATERIAL FEMINISMS (Stacy Alaimo & Susan
Hekman eds., 2008) (collection of essays embracing material feminism).
A second element of the materialist turn comes from science and
technology studies. In a landmark essay published in the mid-1980s, Donna
Haraway sought to break down a number of theoretical dichotomies that in her
view were not helpful to progressive social theory, including the dichotomy
between “nature” and “culture.” Donna Haraway, A Manifesto for Cyborgs:
Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s, 80 SOCIALIST REVIEW
65, 71 (1985). A philosopher of science, Haraway argued that an anti-scientific,
anti-technological search for organic authenticity and purity too often motivated
progressive political thinking, and she celebrated the “cyborg”—a figure neither
purely natural nor purely artificial—as a more appropriate subject of
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contemporary times. Id. at 74–76. Haraway’s work, in turn, explicitly rested on
the work of women of color theorists, such as Chela Sandoval, Gloria Anzaldua,
and Cherrie Moraga, who emphasized “hybridity,” mestizaje, and “racial
borderlands” as key terms for anti-subordinationist theorizing. Id. at 73–74, 94–
95; see also generally Chela Sandoval, U.S. Third World Feminism: The Theory
and Method of Oppositional Consciousness in the Postmodern World, 10
GENDERS 1 (1991) (explaining the hybrid character of differential consciousness
in that it attempts to unite multiple, seemingly different, ideologies); GLORIA
ANZALDUA, BORDERLANDS / LA FRONTERA: THE NEW MESTIZA (4th ed. 2012)
(compilation of poetry and essays describing the hybrid identity of a Chicana
and lesbian activist); THIS BRIDGE CALLED MY BACK: WRITINGS BY RADICAL
WOMEN OF COLOR (Cherríe Moraga & Gloria Anzaldua eds., 3rd ed. 2002)
(highlighting third world feminists’ struggles amidst white feminism). More
recently, physicist and feminist Karen Barad argues that quantum theory has
important implications for philosophy and social theory because it similarly
scrambles binary terms like nature and culture. See KAREN BARAD, MEETING THE
UNIVERSE HALFWAY: QUANTUM PHYSICS AND THE ENTANGLEMENT OF MATTER AND
MEANING 26–27 (2007).
Meanwhile, science and technology scholars such as Bruno Latour came
to their interest in materiality through suspicion of the conventional methods
and assumptions of sociology, which place “the social” and thus human action at
the center of everything important. See, e.g., BRUNO LATOUR, REASSEMBLING THE
SOCIAL: AN INTRODUCTION TO ACTOR-NETWORK THEORY 75 (2005) (highlighting
the constraints of viewing from a social perspective). One outgrowth of their
resistance to traditional sociology is “actor-network theory” or ANT, also called
“material semiotics.” This approach to science and technology refuses to
privilege human activities and actors; it instead views “all kinds of actors
including objects, subjects, human beings, machines, animals, ‘nature,’ ideas,
organizations, inequalities, scale and sizes, and geographical arrangements” as
equally deserving of curiosity and interest in the working of complex systems,
rather than automatically giving human “social” categories, intentions, and
interests pride of place. See John Law, Actor Network Theory and Material
Semiotics, in THE NEW BLACKWELL COMPANION TO SOCIAL THEORY 141 (Bryan S.
Turner ed., 2009) (introducing actor network theory).
Yet a third element of the materialist turn is the environmental
humanities and the study of “material culture.” See generally, LINDA NASH,
INESCAPABLE ECOLOGIES: A HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENT, DISEASE, AND KNOWLEDGE
(2006); Margaret FitzSimmons and David Goodman, Incorporating Nature:
Environmental Narratives and the Reproduction of Food, in REMAKING REALITY:
NATURE AT THE MILLENNIUM 194 (Bruce Braun & Noel Castree eds., 1998)
(arguing how nature should be included in social theory); BILL BROWN, A SENSE
OF THINGS: THE OBJECT MATTER OF AMERICAN LITERATURE (2003). These scholars
look at the social world through objects and nonhuman systems, and like Grosz
and Haraway treat nature and culture not as opposites but as thoroughly
entangled.
Finally, philosophy, especially its phenomenology branch, and political
theory have contributed to materiality theory. See generally BENNETT, supra
note 1 (explaining how political theory has contributed to materiality theory);
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Out of materialist theory comes a dynamic and reciprocal
systems view of the relationship between humans and the
environment. Stacy Alaimo, for instance, has argued, “the
environment, which is too often imagined as inert, empty space or
as a resource for human use, is, in fact, a world of fleshy beings
with their own needs, claims, and actions.” 121 Alaimo calls her
analytic framework “trans-corporeality,” and argues that the
concept “opens up a mobile space that acknowledges the often
unpredictable and unwanted actions of human bodies, nonhuman
creatures, ecological systems, chemical agents, and other
actors.”122 Similarly, Elizabeth Grosz argues that people “need to
understand the body, not as an organism or entity in itself, but as
a system, or series of open-ended systems, functioning within
other huge systems it cannot control through which it can access
and acquire its abilities and capacities.” 123 This understanding
lies close to the understanding of the human body within
disability studies. For instance, Rosemarie Garland-Thompson
writes, “[A]ll bodies are shaped by their environments from the
moment of conception. We transform constantly in response to
our surroundings and register history on our bodies. The changes
that occur when body encounters world are what we call
disability.”124
SARA AHMED, QUEER PHENOMENOLOGY: ORIENTATIONS, OBJECTS, OTHERS (2006)
(explaining that queer phenomenology highlights “how bodies become orient[ed]
by how they take up time and space”); IAN BOGOST, ALIEN PHENOMENOLOGY, OR
WHAT IT’S LIKE TO BE A THING (2012) (arguing that humans should not be the
center of philosophy but rather on a equal plane with the rest of the elements of
the world).
For a good overview of the materialist turn and a useful reflection on
the relationship between the new materialist scholarship and more traditional
scholarship in political economy, see generally Christopher Breu, The Insistence
of the Material: Theorizing Materiality and Biopolitics in the Era of
Globalization, (Institute on Globalization and the Human Condition,
Globalization
Working
Papers
12/2,
2012),
available
at
socialsciences.mcmaster.ca/institute-on-globalization-and-the-humancondition/documents/IGHC-WPS_12-2_Breu.pdf (on file with the WASHINGTON
AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
121.
ALAIMO, supra note 113, at 2.
122.
Id.
123.
ELIZABETH GROSZ, THE NICK OF TIME: POLITICS, EVOLUTION, AND
THE UNTIMELY 3 (2004).
124.
Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, Disability and Representation,
120 PROCEEDINGS OF THE MODERN LANGUAGE ASSOCIATION 522, 524 (2005).
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Political theorist Jane Bennett, who attempts to
investigate “the vitality of matter” and attributes agency to
nonhuman objects, concedes that her seemingly contradictory and
quixotic endeavor is designed to interrogate human means and
ends:
[M]y hunch is that the image of dead or thoroughly
instrumentalized matter feeds human hubris and
our earth-destroying fantasies of conquest and
consumption. It does so by preventing us from
detecting (seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting,
feeling) a fuller range of the nonhuman powers
circulating around and within human bodies. . . .
The figure of an intrinsically inanimate matter
may be one of the impediments to the emergence of
more ecological and more materially sustainable
modes of production and consumption. 125
Bennett thus seeks to bring the nonhuman into political
theory in the service of a humanist goal, “a self-interested or
conative concern for human survival and happiness.”126 She cites
social theorist Felix Guattari, who notes that because the health
of the planet is increasingly reliant on human intervention, a
politics that relies on keeping nature safe from humans will soon
be ineffective.127 Instead, Guattari argues, people should stop
trying to disentangle nature from culture and understand the
environmental, social, and psychic realms as intertwined: “if we
have a humanistic interest in a richer kinship, marital, or civic
life, we had better pursue a more ecological sustainable
relationship with nonhuman nature.”128 Guattari concludes that
“a greener self-culture-nature will require not only new ‘laws,
decrees and bureaucratic programmes’ but ‘new micropolitical
125.
BENNETT, supra note 1, at ix.
126.
See id. at ix–x (describing Bennett’s goal in using dominance
theory in relation to environmentalism).
127.
See id. at 114 (citing FELIX GUATTARI, THREE ECOLOGIES 4
(1986) (“Structuralism and subsequently postmodernism, have accustomed us to
a vision of the world drained of the significance of human interventions
embodied as they are in concrete politics and micropolitics.”).
128.
See BENNETT, supra note 1, at 113 (citing GUATTARI, supra note
127, at 27).
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and microsocial practices, new solidarities, a new gentleness,
together with new aesthetic and new analytic practices regarding
the formation of the unconscious.’” 129 Similarly, Bruno Latour
understands the modern self as “entangled—cosmically,
biotechnologically, medically, virally, pharmacologically—with
nonhuman nature,” and argues for a politics and for policies that
openly acknowledge this fact rather than attempting to
disentangle nature from non-nature.130
What distinguishes this “cyborg constitutionalism”131 from
conventional approaches to environmentalism is, first, an
acceptance of the human proclivity for constantly altering our
relationships with nonhuman environments, a penchant for
transformation that Marx described as our “species-nature.”132
Materialist politics is not the kind of romantic environmentalism
in which one denounces “technology” and seeks an imaginary
past when people “lived in harmony with nature.” 133 Second, a
materialist approach to environmental politics displays humility
about the possibilities of perfect knowledge of and control over
either humans or their environments.134 It acknowledges that
nonhuman systems sometimes act as if they have a will of their
own, a will that cannot always be anticipated in advance. 135
Materialist approaches to technology are thus distinguishable
from the “posthuman” ideology popular in Silicon Valley circles,
129.
BENNETT, supra note 1, at 114 (quoting GUATTARI, supra note
127, at 51).
130.
See BENNETT, supra note 1, at 115–16 (citing Bruno Latour
arguing in favor of a holistic view of both human and nonhuman nature).
131.
The term is a play on Donna Haraway’s famous essay called “A
Cyborg Manifesto.” See Haraway, A Manifesto for Cyborgs, supra note 120.
132.
See Angela P. Harris, Compassion and Critique, 1 COLUM. J.
RACE & L. 326, 333 (2012) (“[I]ntrinsic to human species-being is the capacity
and urge to make things and, in the process, to re-create oneself and all of
nature.”).
133.
For a critique of this fantasy as applied to representations of
the Amazon, see Candace Slater, Amazonia as Edenic Narrative, in UNCOMMON
GROUND: RETHINKING THE HUMAN PLACE IN NATURE 114 (William Cronon ed.,
1996).
134.
See BENNETT, supra note 1, at 113 (explaining the need for a
joint view of both nature and culture).
135.
See ALAIMO, supra note 113, at 1 (“[T]rans-corporeality also
opens up a mobile space that acknowledges the often unpredictable and
unwanted actions of human bodies, nonhuman creatures, ecological systems,
chemical agents, and other actors.”).
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which anticipates a technological “singularity,” a moment in
which human nature will be supplanted by a more perfect
machine nature, either through technologically-assisted
immortality of the body or forms of artificial intelligence that will
surpass human intelligence.136
In line with this humility, materialist theorists reject the
Enlightenment tradition that envisions Man as dominating
Nature.137 In the place of fantasies about perfect control over the
material world, or submission to a perfect “second nature”
emerging from technology, for example, Donna Haraway sees the
ideal relationship between humans and nonhumans as a playful
and reciprocal “worlding” among “companion species.” 138
Although humans can and will attempt to get and keep the upper
hand in these relationships, for Haraway the ultimate path of
any worlding can neither be controlled nor even predicted.139 In
her view, “[t]here is no assured happy or unhappy ending—
socially, ecologically, or scientifically. There is only the chance for
getting on together with some grace.”140
To conclude, theorists of materiality suggest that we
should think of the human subject not as an autonomous and
136.
See generally JARON LANIER, YOU ARE NOT A GADGET: A
MANIFESTO (2011) (critiquing post-humanist thinking from the perspective of a
Silicon Valley insider); EVGENY MOROZOV, TO SAVE EVERYTHING CLICK HERE: THE
FOLLY OF TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTIONISM (2013) (debating the credibility of
technological solutionist views that technology can appropriately address
complex social and environmental issues).
137.
See generally CAROLYN MERCHANT, THE DEATH OF NATURE:
WOMEN, ECOLOGY, AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION (1980) (providing a classic,
explicitly feminist critique of Enlightenment theories of human dominance).
Although this ideology is often associated with the Judeo-Christian tradition
through the text in Genesis in which God gave dominion over the entire nature
world to Adam in Genesis 1:25–27, it is possible to understand that text as
requiring stewardship rather than raw exploitation. See MATTHEW SCULLY,
DOMINION: THE POWER OF MAN, THE SUFFERING OF ANIMALS, AND THE CALL TO
MERCY 70 (2002) (citing Roger Scrunton, Eat Animals! Its’ for Their Own Good,
L.A. TIMES (July 25, 1991), articles.latimes.com/1991-07-25/local/me54_1_animal-rights (last visited Dec. 31, 2014) (on file with the WASHINGTON
AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
138.
See DONNA J. HARAWAY, WHEN SPECIES MEET 182–83 (2008)
(describing relationships between humans and competitive “companion
species”—specifically retrieving dogs).
139.
See ALAIMO, supra note 113, at 2 (explaining the
unpredictability of both human bodies, nonhuman beings, and nature itself).
140.
HARAWAY, WHEN SPECIES MEET, supra note 138, at 15.
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active figure set in, or exercising dominion over, an inert and
passive environment, but as a being that constantly interacts
with nonhuman actors at various levels of scale, in ecologies
small and large.141 They adopt a vision of fundamental
interdependence, not only with other humans but with
nonhuman entities and processes. 142 Their contributions to a
political theory of ecological vulnerability invite us to
acknowledge, respond to, and even celebrate the “transcorporeality” of human being.

B. Two First Principles of Governance in Light of Ecological
Vulnerability
How might these ideas about “trans-corporeality” and
“worlding” be reflected in law? In this subsection, I suggest two
principles of governance from an ecological vulnerability
perspective. The first is a commitment to seeing human rights
and environmental sustainability as inextricably intertwined (the
indivisibility principle). The second is a commitment to antisubordination—a commitment that includes being willing to
subject vulnerability analysis itself to critical scrutiny (the
antidiscrimination principle).

1. The Indivisibility Principle
If the human subject is inextricable from its environment,
care for macro- and micro-ecologies is a central and indispensable
obligation of the state—a condition of the state’s continued
existence and legitimacy. Of course, governments already protect
the environment in various ways. What ecological vulnerability
requires is a recognition that the duty to protect the environment
is on par with the duty to protect human rights.143
141.
See ALAIMO, supra note 113, at 2–3 (challenging the view that
humans control the environment and suggesting that all beings are linked
together and are interdependent).
142.
See id. at 2 (“Imagining human corporeality as transcorporeality, in which the human is always intermeshed with the more-thanhuman world, underlines the extent to which the substance of the human is
ultimately inseparable from the environment.”).
143.
See Fineman, Beyond Identities, supra note 25, at 1727
(suggesting a positive duty of the state to act on behalf on humans by
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The government might reflect this recognition in the form
of strong constitutional or statutory norms, such as a
“precautionary principle” to protect human health, various antipollution regimes, and commitments to public health, including,
for example, principles of food justice.144 More radically, such an
obligation might destabilize the public-private split that
characterizes Anglo-American jurisprudence, undermining the
assumption that common law individualist rights of property and
contract, for instance, are more fundamental than environmental
obligations.145 As in South Africa, where equality norms are
considered “horizontal,” applicable to private as well as public
law, we could imagine norms of ecological sustainability that
applied horizontally throughout private and public law, rather
than vertically from public law down to certain aspects of private
activity.146 In these and other ways, the state should recognize
sustainability as a fundamental value, not only by providing
access to health care but by structuring family, market, and state
addressing external and environmental issues).
144 .
On the precautionary principle, see Frank B. Cross,
Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 851,
851 (1996) (“The [precautionary] principle suggests that government should
take precautions to protect public health and the environment, even in the
absence of clear evidence of harm and notwithstanding the costs of such
action.”). On food justice, see ROBERT GOTTLIEB & ANUPAMA JOSHI, FOOD JUSTICE,
at ix (2013) (describing the food justice movement as “related to three key
arenas for action: (i) seeking to challenge and restructure the dominant food
system, (ii) providing a core focus on equity and disparities and the struggles by
those who are most vulnerable, and (iii) establishing linkages and common goals
with other forms of social justice activism and advocacy—whether immigrant
rights, worker justice, transportation and access, or land use.”).
145.
See Fineman, Beyond Identities, supra note 25, at 1756 (“All
individuals are dependent on society’s institutions, be they deemed public or
private and whether they are called family, market, or state entities, because it
is through institutions that we gain access to resources with which to confront,
ameliorate, satisfy, and compensate for our vulnerability.”); see also Kysar, Law,
Environment, and Vision, supra note 24, at 677 (arguing for private as well as
public environmental rights).
146.
See ANNE HUGHES, HUMAN DIGNITY AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
IN SOUTH AFRICA AND IRELAND 156–57 (2014) (analyzing South African law that
incorporates a total consideration of human dignity to promote horizontal
rights); Jeremy Sarkin, The Drafting of South Africa’s Final Constitution from a
Human-Rights Perspective, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 67, 80 (1999) (“Significantly, the
final Bill of Rights not only binds the state (vertical application) but, to the
extent that the nature of the rights permits, it also binds private and juristic
persons (horizontal application).”).
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activity around the recognition that life on earth depends on the
continuing stability of certain crucial nonhuman systems and
human-nonhuman interfaces and interactions.147

2. The Anti-subordination Principle
A second fundamental commitment necessary to a state
responsive to ecological vulnerability is a commitment to the antisubordination principle.148 The anti-subordination principle is
well-known and central to the work of critical legal scholars, from
American Legal Realism through critical legal studies to critical
race feminism. 149 In the context of ecological vulnerability, the
anti-subordination principle corrects a weakness within
vulnerability theory itself: its susceptibility to universalizing
language and policies that ignore social injustice and thereby
perpetuate it. Commitment to anti-subordination makes visible
the role of power in how people are treated and in how policy
frameworks are developed.
The international effort to curb global warming illustrates
the pragmatic value of the anti-subordination principle as an
element of environmental policy. Efforts to establish effective
international treaties to curb global warming have in the past
foundered on the problem of inequality between rich and poor
countries.150 As several scholars have noted, “expanding the pie”
147.
See Fineman, Elderly as Vulnerable, supra note 25, at 101
(noting a particularized need for states to address the vulnerability connected to
health care).
148.
See Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and
Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1007 (1986) (“Under the antisubordination perspective, it is inappropriate for certain groups in society to
have subordinated status because of their lack of power in society as a whole.”).
149.
See Berta Hernández-Truyól, Angela Harris & Francisco
Valdes, Beyond the First Decade: A Forward-Looking History of LatCrit Theory,
Community and Praxis, 17 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 169, 172–177 (2006) (tracing
history of anti-subordination critique in the American legal academy from
American Legal Realism through LatCrit theory).
150.
J. Timmons Roberts and Bradley Parks explain that inequality
hinders international climate policy agreement in direct and indirect ways.
First, “The extreme poverty of dozens of nations and the relative powerlessness
of a larger number leaves them without the capacity to negotiate effectively
with the North and unable to meaningfully address their emissions of
greenhouse gases because of their extremely undeveloped economies and
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through economic growth has long been treated as the answer to
global economic inequality.151 If expanding the pie is no longer an
option because of strict limits on fossil fuel use, however, then
poor countries risk the inability to alleviate poverty through
industrialization. Poor countries thus see climate change policy
through a development lens, while rich countries tend to treat
development issues as a distraction.152
Carmen Gonzalez argues that at the root of this division
between the rich and poor countries is a historic injustice:
colonialism, which created the conditions for centuries of global
environmental degradation and also gave rise to the language of
“race” to justify complex systems of environmental and economic
exploitation and political subordination. 153 J. Timmons Roberts
and Bradley Parks add that present-day socioeconomic
inequalities stemming from this historic injustice are at the root
of current tensions between rich and poor countries over climate
adaptation and mitigation. They conclude, “Western nations need
to wage a campaign to convince poor nations that they
government agencies.” J. TIMMONS ROBERTS & BRADLEY C. PARKS, A CLIMATE OF
INJUSTICE: GLOBAL INEQUALITY, NORTH-SOUTH POLITICS, AND CLIMATE POLICY 8
(2007). Second, “The experience of poorer nations in the world economy and
their interaction with rich nations across multiple issue areas has reinforced a
worldview and a set of causal beliefs that are at odds with those of the wealthy
nations; this has bred generalized mistrust and polarized expectations about
how to proceed on climate issues.” Id.
151.
See, e.g., M’Gonigle & Takeda, supra note 24, at 1012
(“Economic growth, coupled with productivity-enhancing technology, has
answered the demands of labor not by redistributing the economic pie, but by
increasing its overall size.”); Brian Gilmore, The World Is Yours: “Degrowth,”
Racial Inequality and Sustainability, 5 SUSTAINABILITY 1282, 1282–85 (2013)
(introducing the problems with focusing on economic growth and calling for
“degrowth”).
152.
See ROBERTS & PARKS, supra note 150, at 229–30 (arguing that
“the ongoing development crisis is at the very heart of the climate policy
impasse” and that the “perception that the rich nations are promoting ‘do-as-Isay-not-as-I-do’ policies is particularly damaging because successful transitions
from carbon-intensive to climate-friendly development pathways will require
‘deep’ cooperation between rich and poor nations, which must be underpinned by
conditions of generalized trust and diffuse reciprocity.”).
153.
See Carmen G. Gonzalez, Environmental Justice and
International Environmental Law, Seattle University School of Law Legal Paper
Series # 12–11, 7–8 (2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2011081
(explaining how colonialism established these roots of inequality) (on file with
the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
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understand and care about their position in the international
division of labor and want to help them to escape the scourge of
poverty and structural vulnerability.”154 A shared commitment to
the anti-subordination principle in the context of environmental
crisis may help rich and poor countries move toward such a
“shared worldview,” laying the foundation for the international
trust and cooperation necessary to take comprehensive steps
toward mitigation of and adaptation to global warming.155
Beyond this purely pragmatic argument, the antisubordination principle elaborated by critical legal scholars also
serves a related function: subjecting policy language and
frameworks to critical scrutiny. Critical scholars have taken from
postmodern theory a skeptical vigilance with regard to
knowledge, especially taken-for-granted truths.156 A commitment
to anti-subordination in the form of such skeptical vigilance
fosters both justice for persons (human and non-human) and
humility with respect to our knowledge of, and capacity to wisely
interact with, the non-human world.157
For example, Michael M’Gonigle and Louise Takeda
observe that conventional environmental law and policy has until
now taken place within a thoroughly “modernist” framework:
[The assumptions of the modernist project] pervade
environmental law: that (neutral) science can
provide the knowledge to control environmental
problems, and technology can provide the means;
that markets can “internalize” externalities, and
governments can act to make sure that they do if
only they have “political will;” that progress is still
possible under conditions and thinking inherited
154.
ROBERTS & PARKS, supra note 150, at 217.
155.
See id. at 230 (endorsing the position that under circumstances
of extreme mistrust, it is more important for states to work toward establishing
a “shared worldview” than to provide “strategic reassurance.”).
156.
See generally Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Jurisprudence
of Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L. REV. 741 (1994) (describing the “hermeneutics of
suspicion” as a hallmark of critical race theory).
157.
See Roberto M. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement,
96 HARV. L. REV. 561, 582 (1983) (“Every stabilized social world depends, for its
serenity, upon the redefinition of power and preconception as legal right or
practical necessity.”).
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from an age long passed. All we really need is to do
what is rational.158

These assumptions badly need critical scrutiny, and the
anti-subordination principle provides a vehicle for that scrutiny.
Keenly aware of the human capacity for bending rationality in
order to accommodate hierarchies of power, critical theorists
constantly search discourses of truth and claims to objectivity
and neutrality for evidence of bias.159 The hermeneutics of
suspicion can yield a healthy humility and willingness to be selfcritical, qualities that are useful in a time of scientific
uncertainty when the stakes are higher than ever in human
history. Without this commitment, vulnerability theory lacks a
similar meta-commitment to self-critique; indeed, insofar as it
rests on the conception that there are some universal
characteristics of the human condition, it risks complacency that
we know who we are and what is to be done for everyone in the
world.160
This point takes us to a central weakness in the term
“vulnerability” itself. This Article has argued that ecological
vulnerability, understood as a fundamental condition of human
existence to which the state must respond, usefully resituates the
human subject within a trans-human world that must be
protected and sustained in order for humanity itself to survive. 161
As it happens, however, “vulnerability” is already a key word of

158.
M’Gonigle & Takeda, supra note 24 at 1106.
159.
See Unger, supra note 157, at 582 (noting the importance of
critical theory in addressing social problems).
160.
See Ann-Belinda S. Preis, Human Rights as Cultural Practice:
An Anthropological Critique, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 286, 288 (1996) (criticizing the
effects of cultural relativism). In the discipline of cultural anthropology, for
instance, postmodern theorists in the 1980s rebelled against their forerunners’
interest in identifying practices and ideals universal to all human cultures. Id.
In the name of “cultural relativism,” anthropologists influenced by
postmodernism questioned whether there were any such universal practices,
and questioned whether, even if there were, the ability of Westerners to identify
and describe them without bias. Id.
161.
See Fineman, Beyond Identities, supra note 25, at 1754
(“Considering the structural components of universal vulnerability raises a
paradox: while human vulnerability is initially conceptualized as universal and
constant, it also must be recognized that the experience of vulnerability is
particular, varied, and unique on the individual level.”).
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policy literature, and there it does not always mean what
Fineman and I want it to mean.162
To begin with, the term is widely used but has no agreedupon meaning. Hans-Martin Füssel observes:
The ordinary use of the word “vulnerability” refers
to the capacity to be wounded, i.e. the degree to
which a system is likely to experience harm due to
exposure to a hazard. The scientific use of
“vulnerability” has its roots in geography and
natural hazards research but this term is now a
central concept in a variety of other research
contexts such as ecology, public health, poverty and
development, secure livelihoods and famine,
sustainability science, land change, and climate
impacts
and
adaptation.
Vulnerability
is
conceptualized in very different ways by scholars
from different knowledge domains, and even within
the same domain. For instance, natural scientists
and engineers tend to apply the term in a
descriptive manner whereas social scientists tend
to use it in the context of a specific explanatory
model.163
The many different meanings and uses of “vulnerability”
make possible not only confusion and uncertainty, but uses of the
term that are precisely opposite to the purpose of ecological
vulnerability analysis. Fineman acknowledges, for instance, that
162.
The problem may begin with semantics. Hans- Martin Füssel’s
understanding of the ordinary meaning of the term as the capacity to be harmed
describes a result, not the processes that led to the result. “Vulnerability” is
easily made into an adjective characterizing people and groups, thus diverting
attention from their institutional context.
Using the same word to describe universal aspects of the human
condition and to describe the complex ways in which the lives of some people are
made more precarious than others makes it easy to avoid the problem of
political inequality. Although Fineman’s argument that humans are all
vulnerable (and that, at the same time, some are more vulnerable than others)
makes perfect theoretical sense, the door is left open to mischief.
163.
Hans-Martin Füssel, Vulnerability: A Generally Applicable
Conceptual Framework for Climate Change Research, 17 GLOBAL ENVTL.
CHANGE 155, 155 (2007) (citations omitted).
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“vulnerability” can be used as a stigmatizing label that is applied
only to some humans. As she observes, “[T]hose who are not seen
as sufficiently autonomous and independent actors are herded
together in designated ‘vulnerable populations’ and are
susceptible to monitoring, discipline, and supervision.” 164
Fineman further observes, as we have seen, that populations
considered insufficiently autonomous are often designated as
either “deserving” or “undeserving.”165 The deserving
vulnerable—like children—are treated with paternalism. The
undeserving vulnerable—like the able-bodied poor—are managed
through surveillance, discipline, and/or punishment.166
Another example of how easily Fineman’s concept of
vulnerability can be turned against itself can be taken from
American environmental policy. “Plan EJ 2014” (Plan EJ) is a
strategy document developed by the Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”) as part of its mandate to incorporate principles of
environmental justice in the implementation of its rules and
164.
Fineman, Elderly as Vulnerable, supra note 25, at 84.
165.
See id. at 79 (discussing the view of elderly citizens as those
who have contributed to society and thereby are deserving of accommodation).
166.
See id at 85. Fineman puts it this way:
If someone is very young, profoundly ill or disabled, or very old, we may
not be comfortable demanding they conform to the mandates of selfsufficiency and independence. They are perceived as needing protection,
and paternalism guides society's response—which is to withhold
agency, as is the case with children, or take away agency based on
assumptions about lack of capacity, as we do with many of the elderly.
On the other hand, when someone is deemed a societal failure as the
result of “choices” they have made, it is a different story. Poor single
mothers, those who are unemployed and did not graduate from high
school, those who were forced into default because they consented to
terms in technically legal but morally indefensible contracts with
aggressive financial institutions, and those who engaged in other risky
or foolish behavior are seen as in need of discipline. We are concerned
with the “moral hazard” implications should their bad choices be
“rewarded” with societal support. . . .
The third group determined to be a vulnerable population includes
those deemed deviant and dangerous, such as prisoners or so-called
“youth-at-risk” who engage in aggressive anti-social behavior. This
group is determined to need even more discipline and control. They are
often separated out from society in facilities, segregated and punished
for their choices and behavior. (citations omitted).
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rulemaking.167 Plan EJ does not use the word “vulnerable” in the
main text of the document; instead, it speaks of “overburdened
communities.”168 However, a footnote reveals that “overburdened
communities” are defined in terms of vulnerability:
In Plan EJ 2014, EPA uses the term
“overburdened” to describe the minority, lowincome, tribal, and indigenous populations or
communities in the United States that potentially
experience disproportionate environmental harms
and risks as a result of greater vulnerability to
environmental
hazards.
This
increased
vulnerability may be attributable to an
accumulation of both negative and lack of positive
environmental, health, economic, or social
conditions
within
these
populations
or
169
communities.
This definition connects vulnerability to economic and
social conditions, as Fineman argues it should.170 Yet it does so in
167.
See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF
ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE,
PLAN
EJ
2014,
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/ej/resources/policy/plan-ej-2014/plan-ej-201109.pdf (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND
THE ENVIRONMENT). Plan EJ 2014 was created with the 20th anniversary of
President Clinton’s Executive Order 12898 in mind. Id. at i. Executive Order
12898, promulgated in 1994, requires that:
To the greatest extent practicable and permitted by law, . . . each
Federal agency shall make achieving environmental justice part of its
mission
by
identifying
and
addressing,
as
appropriate,
disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental
effects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority populations
and low-income populations in the United States and its territories and
possessions, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, and the Commonwealth of the Marian islands. Exec. Order No.
12898, 59 Fed. Reg. 9629 (Feb. 26, 1994).
168.
See PLAN EJ 2014, supra note 167, at i (stating the goal of Plan
EJ: “to more effectively protect human health and the environment for
overburdened populations by developing and implementing guidance on
incorporating environmental justice into EPA’s rulemaking process”).
169.
Id. at 1, n. 1.
170.
See Fineman, Beyond Identities, supra note 25, at 1755
(arguing that “the variations in social location that are produced as the result of
institutional practices and operations . . . becomes the most significant focus for
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a fashion that makes relations of power and politics hard to see.
In the Plan EJ passage, the disproportionate environmental
harms attributed to minority, low-income, and indigenous
communities are attributed to their greater vulnerability. This
vulnerability is in turn attributed to the communities themselves,
which have somehow accumulated “negative conditions” and lack
“positive conditions.” In contrast, environmental justice
advocates, using an anti-subordination lens to approach
ecological vulnerability, have called attention to the role of social
injustices, especially racism and poverty, in determining who and
to what extent people suffer from environmental harms.171
Without a robust commitment to anti-subordination, even a
document claiming an explicit “justice” orientation, like Plan EJ,
may use the language of vulnerability so as to avoid talking about
the role of political and social subordination in making
populations “vulnerable” in the first place.172
This lack of attention to the role of power and privilege
also has the capacity to influence the path of scientific research
and technical expertise. For example, at a 2010 symposium
entitled ‘‘Strengthening Environmental Justice Research and
Decision Making: A Symposium on the Science of
Disproportionate Environmental Health Impacts,’’ participants,
including EPA officials, scientists, and representatives of
community-based organizations, discussed EPA’s role in
collecting and disseminating research on environmental health.173
a vulnerability analysis.”).
171.
See LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP:
ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM AND THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
MOVEMENT 21 (2000) (noting that civil rights activists brought to the
environmental justice movement “a perspective that recognized that the
disproportionate impact of environmental hazards was not random or the result
of ‘neutral’ decisions but a product of the same and social and economic
structure which had produced de jure and de facto segregation and other racial
oppression”).
172.
See Tom E.R.B. West, Environmental Justice and Internationl
Climate Change Legislation: A Cosmopolitan Perspective, 25 GEO. INT’L ENVTL.
REV. 129, 151 (“Climate change legislation has begun to address the former
oversight through differentiated emission reduction targets in the Kyoto
Protocol and acknowledgement of the special situations of certain vulnerable
countries . . . .”).
173.
See Strengthening Environmental Justice Research and
Decision Making: A Symposium on the Science of Disproportionate
Environmental Health Impacts (Disproportionate Impacts Symposium), U.S.
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Dayne Payne-Sturges, a co-organizer of the symposium, later
reflected that “[s]ymposium participants were concerned that the
EPA had not prioritized research on vulnerability, particularly
the social and cultural aspects of it in the agency’s research
programs.”174 Payne-Sturges further explains:
EPA-supported
research,
assessments,
and
solutions are rarely aimed at why these hazards
are there in the first place, at who and what
systems create and maintain the observed
racial/ethnic and class disparities in exposures or
environmental degradation, and at what can be
done to prevent these hazards from impacting the
community. Focusing research and policies on the
processes that lead to environmental inequities and
then on the measures needed to alter these unjust
processes (as opposed to focusing on single cases of
environmental inequality) will likely lead to the
greatest social and environmental improvements.175
The EPA is far from unique in employing the language of
vulnerability to obscure the political and social roots of that
vulnerability. The field of public health has been criticized for, as
one scholar puts it, employing “a subtle assumption that the
genesis of vulnerability and suffering is the individual and his or
her choices.”176 In the public health literature, “vulnerability” is
joined to other key words that obscure power, such as “risk” and
“disparities.”177 Identifying the problem of “vulnerability” as the
ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION
AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/ncer/events/news/2010/03_17_10_calendar.html (last visited
Nov. 11, 2014) (advertising the symposium and topics scheduled to be discussed)
(on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY CLIMATE, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT).
174.
Devon Payne-Sturges, Humanizing Science at the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, 101 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH SUPPLEMENT 1, at S8,
S9 (2011).
175.
Id. at S10.
176.
Seth M. Holmes, Structural Vulnerability and Hierarchies of
Ethnicity and Citizenship on the Farm, 30 MEDICAL ANTHROPOLOGY: CROSSCULTURAL STUDIES IN HEALTH AND ILLNESS 425, 447 (2011).
177.
See Dayna B. Matthew, Disastrous Disasters: Restoring Civil
Rights Protection for the Victims of the State in Natural Disasters, 2 J. HEALTH &
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presence of “disparities” or “disproportionality” tends to call
attention away from political and social injustices, as well as from
how equality is being defined.178 Looking for “risk factors” that
lead to disparities or disproportionality makes it easy to focus on
characteristics of the individual or population under study, and
not the institutional dynamics that contribute to those
characteristics.179 Moreover, even where critics have shifted the
public health discussion in a structural direction toward social
institutions and dynamics of injustice such as racial
discrimination (the so-called “upstream” factors contributing to
vulnerability), some worry that researchers may fail to take
account
of
“preservation
through
transformation”—
discrimination’s capacity to change form over time.180 Given the
existing bias in policy analysis toward foregrounding the
individual, “vulnerability” and its cognates are far too easily
coopted.
Thus, while Fineman may be right that a vulnerability
analysis should call attention to the institutional conditions that
construct that vulnerability, conventionally it is capable of doing
just the opposite. Vulnerability, in policy analysis, is commonly
treated as a fixed characteristic of the population or individual in
question, rather than as the outcome of social and political
relations.181 By obscuring the political and institutional
BIOMEDICAL L. 213, 227 (2006) (discussing the application of Title VI of the Civil
Right Act of 1964 to public health disparities resulting from national disasters).
178.
See id. at 248 (“The impact of racial and economic injustice is
magnified when the very governmental authority charged with protecting and
promoting public health, instead takes the occasion of a devastating hurricane,
flood, earthquake, tornado or storm that is completely out of its control, to
impose differential policies and procedures that are fully within its control.”).
179.
See id. (highlighting more pervasive and universal policies of
injustice).
180.
See e.g., Lisa C. Ikemoto, In the Shadow of Race: Women of
Color in Health Disparities Policy, 39 U.C. DAVIS L.REV. 1023, 1056 (2006)
(commenting on a new “structural” approach to the study of health care
disparities). Ikemoto suggests that the enthusiasm for identifying and attacking
racial discrimination in the provision of health care and the training of health
care workers, although it might do much good, “might not prevent the
underlying ideologies from reconstituting into new practices and standards that
would, in turn, undermine the gains made.” Id. Ikemoto calls for a “critical
cultural inquiry” that would explicitly focus on power relations and draw on the
work of critical theorists. See id.
181.
See Fineman, Beyond Identities, supra note 25, at 1750
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components of vulnerability, conventional policy analysis has the
potential to portray domination as difference, and to hide the
problem of unequal distribution of benefits and burdens within a
universalist framework.182 Recognition of vulnerability must
therefore be supplemented with an explicit commitment to the
anti-subordination principle, which requires us to look for power
and injustice even in our language and our frameworks for
research and policy.183
Feminist theorist Martha Minow saw a similar problem with
the language of “difference” then pervading antidiscrimination
jurisprudence.184 Identifying five “unstated assumptions” in
Supreme Court jurisprudence about the nature of difference,
Minow argued:
Each of these assumptions bears the imprint of an
historical association between power and the
production of knowledge about the world. Thus, the
characteristics and experiences of those people who
have had power to construct legal rules and social
arrangements also influence and reflect the dominant
cultural expressions of what in different and what is
normal.185

(“Certain characteristics or identity markers associated with historic
disadvantage also sometimes qualify for inclusion within vulnerable population
status.”).
182.
See id. (“This targeted-group approach to vulnerability ignores
its universality and inappropriately constructs relationships of difference and
distance between individuals and groups within society.”).
183.
See Larry A. DiMatteo, Reason and Context: A Dual Track
Theory, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 397, 412 (noting the legal realist idea that human
knowledge and experience should influence analysis of law).
184.
See generally Martha Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered,
101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987) (reviewing the 1986 Supreme Court Term and the
issues of difference that arose).
185.
Id. at 33. The five assumptions Minow found in Supreme Court
jurisprudence and subjected to critical scrutiny were: (1) that difference is
intrinsic, not relational; (2) that the norm against which “difference” is judged
may be left implicit and unstated; (3) that the observer can see without a
perspective; (4) that other perspectives are irrelevant; and (5) that the status
quo is natural, uncoerced, and good. Id. at 34–58 (challenging each assumption
in detail).
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In her critical analysis of these hidden assumptions, Minow
acknowledged a debt to feminists, who have painstakingly sought
to uncover the unstated assumptions underlying patriarchal
power.186 Minow concluded that making “audible, in official
arenas, the struggles over which version of reality will secure
power” was the only way to do justice in a democracy.187
A commitment to anti-subordination can provide a similar
rigorous check on bias toward power within the framework of
ecological vulnerability. A model of how this can be done can be
seen in the field of social epidemiology, where Nancy Krieger
champions an “eco-social” approach to the study of human health.
Krieger argues that this approach to scientific research “can
begin to elucidate population patterns of health, disease and wellbeing as biological expressions of social relations, and can
likewise begin to see how social relations influence our most basic
understandings of biology and our social constructions of
disease—thereby potentially generating new knowledge and new
grounds for action.”188 In her view, a central construct of the ecosocial approach is “embodiment,” “a concept referring to how we
literally incorporate, biologically, the material and social world in
which we live, from conception to death; a corollary is that no
aspect of our biology can be understood absent knowledge of
history and individual and societal ways of living.”189 Krieger’s
notion of embodiment captures both the indivisibility principle
and the anti-subordination principle, and usefully turns each
upon the other.
This subsection has championed two complementary first
principles for taking ecological vulnerability into account in legal
186.
See id. at 61 (“Leading feminists have contributed incisive
critiques of the unstated assumptions behind political theory, law, bureaucracy,
science, and social science. Their work exposes the dominance in field after field
of conceptions of human nature that take a male as the reference point and
treat women as “other,” “different,” “deviant,” “exceptional,” or baffling.
Feminist work has thus named the power of naming and has challenged both
the use of male measures and the assumption that women fail by them.”).
187.
Id. at 95. For an even more radical call for multiple voices to be
heard in struggles over how to define communities and set community rules, see
generally BRUNO LATOUR, POLITICS OF NATURE: HOW TO BRING THE SCIENCES INTO
DEMOCRACY (Catherine Porter trans., 2004).
188.
Nancy Krieger, Theories for Social Epidemiology in the 21st
Century: An Ecosocial Perspective, 30 INT’L J. OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 668, 672 (2001).
189.
Id.
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and political theory. On the one hand, theories of social justice
are incomplete without the recognition that the subject of justice
is embedded within complex relations with the trans-human and
non-human, vulnerable across the life span and not fully separate
from the “environment” that sustains all life on the planet. On
the other hand, without a commitment to anti-subordination,
vulnerability theory threatens to become just another way to
foster injustice. Dual commitments to indivisibility and antisubordination will help ensure the integrity of the ecological
vulnerability framework.

C. Existing Models for Ecological Vulnerability
Although a complete account is beyond the scope of this
Article, I want to end by acknowledging that the kind of
intellectual, political, and legal projects suggested by the
ecological vulnerability framework already exist.
One intellectual project compatible with ecological
vulnerability
is
Julian
Agyeman’s
concept
of
“just
sustainability.”190 Just sustainability embraces just social
relations among persons, and sustainable relations between
humans and the nonhuman world (in its spatial dimension,
preserving the web of life across the planet; and in its temporal
dimension, preserving the web not just for a single generation,
but for future generations). Agyeman describes it as “the need to
ensure a better quality of life for all, now and into the future, in a
just and equitable manner, whilst living within the limits of
supporting ecosystems.”191 In accordance with the indivisibility
principle and the anti-subordination principle, Agyeman’s
understanding of just sustainability links “the richer countries
and the not-for-profits of the global North that want to discuss a
190.
See e.g., JULIAN AGYEMAN, INTRODUCING JUST SUSTAINABILITIES:
POLICY, PLANNING, AND PRACTICE 4–5 (2013) (arguing that social needs and
welfare need to be included in the just sustainability theory); Julian Agyeman,
Toward a “Just” Sustainability?, 22 CONTINUUM: JOURNAL OF MEDIA AND
CULTURAL STUDIES 751, 755 (2010) (listing the four areas of concern for the Just
Sustainability Paradigmas “(1) Quality of Life; (2) Present and Future
Generations; (3) Justice and Equity; [and] (4) Living within Ecosystem Limits”).
191.
Agyeman, Toward a “Just” Sustainability?, supra note 190, at
755 (citing JUST SUSTAINABILITIES: DEVELOPMENT IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD 5
(Julian Agyeman et al. eds., 2003)).
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‘green’ agenda of environmental protection, biodiversity, and the
protection of the ozone layer” with “those poorer ones in the
South that are proponents of a ‘brown’ agenda of poverty
alleviation,
infrastructural
development,
health
and
education.”192
The best example of an existing political project consonant
with ecological vulnerability is the environmental justice
movement. In 1991, organizers from the civil rights movement,
the “anti-toxics” movement, indigenous nations, and the
farmworkers’ movement came together at the first People of Color
Environmental Leadership Summit in Washington, D.C. and
agreed upon seventeen “principles of environmental justice.” 193
The preamble to these principles states:
We, the people of color, gathered together at this
multinational People of Color Environmental
Leadership Summit, to begin to build a national
and international movement of all peoples of color
to fight the destruction and taking of our lands and
communities, do hereby re-establish our spiritual
interdependence to the sacredness of our Mother
Earth; to respect and celebrate each of our cultures,
languages and beliefs about the natural world and
our roles in healing ourselves; to ensure
environmental justice; to promote economic
alternatives which would contribute to the
development of environmentally safe livelihoods;
and, to secure our political, economic and cultural
liberation that has been denied for over 500 years
of colonization and oppression, resulting in the
poisoning of our communities and land and the

192.
Id. at 753.
193.
See Dorceta E. Taylor, The Rise of the Environmental Justice
Paradigm: Injustice Framing and the Social Construction of Environmental
Discourses, 43 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 508, 539–42 (2000) (outlining and
analyzing the Principles). For a general introduction to the U.S. environmental
justice movement, see COLE & FOSTER, supra note 171. For an introduction to
the global environmental justice movement, see RAMACHANDRA GUHA,
ENVIRONMENTALISM: A GLOBAL HISTORY (2000).
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genocide of our peoples, do affirm and adopt these
Principles of Environmental Justice.194
The principles expressed by the environmental justice
advocates who gathered in Washington, D.C. in 1991 are fully in
line with ecological vulnerability: care for the earth and for social
justice simultaneously; an understanding that human life is
inextricably intertwined with life and non-life, human and not, at
many levels of scale; an understanding of political obligation as
necessarily founded on obligations to the web of life that sustains
the subjects of politics; and a commitment to critique,
understanding that objectivity and neutrality are useful ideals
but that we live in a non-ideal world shaped by domination.
Finally, something quite similar to the framework I have
named ecological vulnerability has already reached law and
public policy in South America under the name of buen vivir, or
vivir bien (literally, “the good life” or “living well”). Tracing the
origins of buen vivir, Eduardo Gudynas identifies one of its
sources as a critique of the practices and language of
international development in the global South.195 Early uses of
buen vivir, Gudynas explains, “highlighted the shortcomings and
negative impacts of development projects implemented by
governments and multilateral development banks in Latin
America in the last decades.”196 Such projects, such as dams,
unfortunately often led to disappointing results in terms of
poverty reduction, while at the same time creating environmental

194.
Principles of Economic Justice, Preamble: 1991 Leadership
Summit, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE/ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM, available at
http://www.ejnet.org/ej/principles.html (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE
JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
195.
See Eduardo Gudynas, Buen Vivir: Today’s Tomorrow, 54
DEVELOPMENT 441, 442 (2011) (explaining the origins of the buen vivir
movement in South America).
196.
Id.; see generally Eduardo Gudynas & Alberto Acosta, La
renovación de la critica desarrollo y el buen vivir como alternativa, J.
SUSTAINABILITY
EDUC.
(Mar.
19,
2012)
http://www.jsedimensions.org/wordpress/content/la-renovacion-de-la-critica-aldesarrollo-y-el-buen-vivir-como-alternativa_2012_03/ (arguing that the ideals of
buen vivir and its indigenous roots has led to the emergence of the “new left”)
(on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT).
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havoc and distress in the communities they overshadowed.197
More generally, the proponents of buen vivir are critical of
resource extraction as the preferred development path for poor
nations, for both social and environmental reasons.198
According to Gudynas, the second origin point of buen
vivir is positive rather than negative: Latin American indigenous
philosophies that offer a radical alternative to the mindset and
the practices of capitalism. 199 As Gudynas notes, one of the bestknown sources of buen vivir is “the Ecuadorian concept of sumak
kawsay, the kichwa [Quechua] wording for a fullness life in a
community, together with other persons and Nature. More or less
at the same time that sumak kawsay became spoken about in
Ecuador in Bolivia a similar [A]ymara concept of suma qamaña
emerged.”200 Another indigenous philosophy from the Guaraní
people involves “ideas of the harmonious living (ñandereko), good

197.
See MCNEILL, supra note 4, at 181–82 (discussing the
environmental and social harms of dam-building projects in the twentieth
century). McNeill comments, “Dams displaced millions without compensation,
perhaps 40 million over the course of the century, three-quarters of them in
India and China.” Id. at 182.
198.
See, e.g., Eduardo Gudynas, Extracciones, Extractivismos y
Extrahecciones: Un Marco Conceptual sobre la Apropiacion de Recursos
Naturales, 18 OBSERVATORIO DEL DESARROLLO 1, 3 (2013), available at
http://www.extractivismo.com/documentos/GudynasApropiacionExtractivismoE
xtraheccionesOdeD2013.pdf (defining “extractivismo” as a type of natural
resource extraction characterized by large volume or high intensity that is
oriented toward foreign export of unprocessed or barely processed materials) (on
file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT); ROBERTS & PARKS, supra note 150, at 112 (using the term
“extractive state” to describe “nations that are heavily dependent upon exports
of raw and barely processed materials (mining and lumbering resources as well
as ranching and plantation agriculture)” and noting that such states are also
“notorious for their feeble domestic institutions”). Some scholars have
nicknamed the combination of resource extraction and weak civil society
institutions as “the resource curse.” See, e.g., Dustin N. Sharp, Requiem for a
Pipedream: Oil, the World Bank, and the Need for Human Rights Assessments,
25 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 379, 379 (2011) (“More often than not, the revenues that
should in theory be a great boon to development are in practice associated with
disastrous human rights fallout as living standards actually decrease and
governance indicators worsen, a phenomenon known as the ‘resource curse’”).
199.
See Gudynas, Buen Vivir, supra note 195, at 442 (discussing
the indigenous origins of the buen vivir movement).
200.
Id. at 442–43
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life (teko kavi), the land without evil (ivi maraei) and the path to
the noble life (qhapaj ñan).”201
Arising from these dual origins, Gudynas argues, buen
vivir has become the umbrella term for an ongoing multicultural
dialogue around a variety of themes. One of these themes is “a
reaction against the conventional domination of utilitarian
values, particularly expressed in the reductionism of life to
economic values and the subsequent commoditization of almost
everything.”202 Another theme of buen vivir is the indivisibility
principle, as Gudynas explains:
Buen Vivir promotes the dissolution of the SocietyNature dualism. Nature becomes part of the social
world, and political communities could extend in
some cases to the non-human. These include, as
examples, the proposals of the biocentric
environmental perspective, but also indigenous
positions that recognize that the non-human (either
animals, plants, ecosystems or spirits) have will
and feelings. Thus, the polis is expanded, and the
concept of citizenship is widened to include these
other actors within environmental settings.203
Buen vivir is not only an influential ideology in South
America; in some nations it has been written into law. For
example, in the most recent version of the Bolivian Constitution
(approved in 2009), the term “Vivir Bien,” along with its Aymara
and Guaraní cognates, is included in Title 1, Chapter 2, Article 8,
the section devoted to the ethical and moral principles describing
the values, ends, and objectives of the state.204 Moreover, the
section links these terms to principles more familiar in the West,
such as unity, equality, dignity, inclusion, equal opportunity,

201.
See id. at 443 (describing buen vivir as “[a] plural endeavor”).
202.
Id. at 445.
203.
Id.
204.
República del Bolivia, Constitución de 2009, Primera Parte,
Título
I,
Capítulo
Segundo,
Artículo
8,
(Bol.)
available
at
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Bolivia/bolivia09.html
[Bolivian
Constitution] (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY,
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
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freedom, solidarity, reciprocity, and social justice.205 This
structure can be understood as incorporating the antisubordination principle as well as the indivisibility principle into
Bolivian constitutional law.
Statutory law has followed this constitutional lead. For
example, in October of 2012 the legislative assembly of Bolivia
approved a new law, the Act Concerning the Term “Madre Tierra”
and Integrated Development for Vivir Bien (“the Madre Tierra
Law”).206 Article 1 of the statute introduces the term “integrated
development.” Integrated development, according to the statute,
is to be undertaken in harmony and equilibrium with Mother
Earth with the goals of fostering Vivir Bien, guaranteeing the
regenerative capacity of the components and systems of life, and
recovering and strengthening local and traditional knowledge.207
The Madre Tierra Law defines “Mother Earth” in this way:
Mother Earth is a living, dynamic system in
conformance with the indivisible community of all
living systems and living beings, interrelated,
interdependent and complementary, sharing a
common destiny. Mother Earth is considered
sacred; it feeds and is a home that contains,
sustains and reproduces all living beings,
ecosystems, biodiversity, organic societies and the
individuals that compose them.208
205.
Id.
206.
Ley Marco De La Madre Tierra y Desarrollo Integral Para
Vivir Bien [Mother Earth and Integral Development for Living Well Framework
Law], Law No. 300, 15 de Octubre de 2012, art. 1 (Bol.) [hereinafter Madre
Tierra Law].
207.
See Madre Tierra Law, art. 1, supra note 210 (“La presente
Ley tiene por objecto establecer la vision y los fundamentos del desarrollo
integral en armonía y equilibrio con la Madre Tierra para Vivir Bien,
garantizando la continuidad de la capacidad de regeneración de los components
y sistemas de vida de la Madre Tierra, recuperando y fortalenciendo los saberes
locales y conocimientos ancestrales”).
208.
Madre Tierra Law, art. 5, supra note 210 (Madre Tierra “es el
Sistema viviente dinámico conformado por la comunidad indivisible de todos los
sistemas de vida y los seres vivos, interrelacionados, interdependientes y
complementarios, que comparten un destino común. La Madre Tierra es
considerada sagrada; alimenta y es el hogar que contiene, sostiene y reproduce a
todos los seres vivos, los ecosistemas, la biodiversidad, las sociedades orgánicas
y los individuos que la componen.”).
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As two commentators explain,209 the law—treating
“integrated development as inextricably intertwined with el vivir
bien (defined as synonymous with the indigenous terms sumaj
kamaňa, sumaj kausay, and yaiko kavi pave)—takes note of the
poverty that afflicts many Bolivians, and declares it the
obligation of the state to create the material conditions to
guarantee self-determination. The law then sets out ten
“objectives” and eleven “bases and orientations of integrated
development.” Among these are norms concerning food security;
protections for biodiversity and the country’s “genetic patrimony”
(patrimonio genético) including the goal of moving away from
reliance on genetically modified organisms; special procedural
protections for forest areas being considered for development; and
goals concerning sustainable energy, water consumption, and
hazardous waste production. 210 Finally, the law creates new
administrative structures to promote these goals, including a
national body with authority, in conjunction with the Central
Bank of Bolivia, to promote mechanisms aimed at preventing and
adapting to climate change.211
Like the Bolivian Constitution, the Ecuadorian
Constitution of 2008 incorporates the concept of buen vivir.212
Title II, Chapter 2, entitled “Rights of Buen Vivir,” articulates a
series of socioeconomic rights, including rights to water and food
(section 1), rights to freedom of communication and conscience
(section 3), and the right to health (section 7). Article 14 of this
chapter includes among these rights of buen vivir the right of the
population to live in an environment that is clean and in
ecological balance, which will in turn guarantee sustainability

209.
See René Orellana Halkyer & Diego Pacheco Balanza, La Ley
Marco de la Madre Tierra y Desarrollo Integral para Vivir Bien, 479 AMERICA
LATINA EN MOVIMIENTO 22 (2012).
210.
Id.
211.
Id.
212.
For a detailed review of the incorporation of buen vivir in the
2008 Ecuadorian Constitution, see Alberto Acosta, “El Buen Vivir en el camino
del post-desarrollo: Una lectura desde la Constitución de Montecristi,” Friedrich
Ehberg Stiftung Policy Paper 9 (October 2010),
available at
http://cadtm.org/IMG/pdf/El_Buen_Vivir_en_el_camino_del_post-desarrollo_Una_lectura_desde_la_Constitucion_de_Montecristi.pdf (on file with the
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
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and buen vivir/sumak kawsay. 213 Title VI, Chapter 1, Article 275
declares that, as a matter of general principles, economic
development shall follow principles of buen vivir/sumak
kawsay,214 and that buen vivir requires individuals, communities,
peoples and nationalities to exercise their rights and
responsibilities within a framework of multiculturalism, respect
for diversity, and harmonious coexistence with nature.215
Going further, the Ecuadorian Constitution also sets out
in Title II, Chapter 7 a series of rights belonging to nature
itself.216 For example, Article 71 of this chapter declares that
Nature or Pachamama, as the place where life is reproduced and
created, has the right to have its existence respected with
integrity, and the right to the maintenance and regeneration of
its vital cycles, structure, functions and evolutionary processes.217
Like the ideal of “just sustainability,” the ideal of buen
vivir incorporates the indivisibility principle. It treats human and
non-human systems as inextricably intertwined and interdependent, and rejects the conventional view that humans can
and should dominate Nature. The Bolivian and Ecuadorian
213.
See República del Ecuador, Constituciones de 2008
[Constitution], Título II, Capítulo Segundo, Art. 14 (Ecuador) (“Se reconoce el
derecho de la población a vivir en un ambiente sano y ecológicamente
equilibrado, que garantice la sostenibilidad y el buen vivir, sumak kawsay.”),
available
at
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Ecuador/ecuador08.html#mozTocId70
5782 (last updated July 11, 2011) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE
JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
214.
See República del Ecuador, Constituciones de 2008
[Constitution], Título VI, Capítulo Primero, Art. 275 (Ecuador) (“El régimen de
desarrollo es el conjunto organizado, sostenible y dinámico de los sistemas
económicos, políticos, socio-culturales y ambientales, que garantizan la
realización del buen vivir, del sumak kawsay.”).
215.
See id. (“El buen vivir requerirá que las personas,
comunidades, pueblos y nacionalidades gocen efectivamente de sus derechos, y
ejerzan responsabilidades en el marco de la interculturalidad, del respeto a sus
diversidades, y de la convivencia armónica con la naturaleza.”).
216.
See República del Ecuador, Constituciones de 2008
[Constitution], Título II, Capítulo Séptimo, “Derechos de la naturaleza” [rights
of nature] (Ecuador).
217.
See República del Ecuador, Constituciones de 2008
[Constitution], Título II, Capítulo Séptimo, Art. 71 (Ecuador) (“La naturaleza o
Pacha Mama, donde se reproduce y realiza la vida, tiene derecho a que se
respete integralmente su existencia y el mantenimiento y regeneración de sus
ciclos vitales, estructura, funciones y procesos evolutivos.”)
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Constitutions and the Madre Tierra Law also reject the view that
economic practices and institutions like markets are properly
outside politics and that development comes first and
redistribution later. At the same time, these constitutional and
statutory texts incorporate the anti-subordination principle. They
symbolically challenge the long domination of indigenous nations
with their use of indigenous as well as Spanish terms for
harmonious living, and the inclusion of multiple human rights,
including socioeconomic rights, makes the commitment material
as well as symbolic. As ecological vulnerability suggests, buen
vivir, as incorporated in these constitutional and statutory
doctrines, begins to rethink legal theory and legal practices and
institutions in ways that foster the intertwining of social justice
and economic sustainability.

IV. Conclusion
In a recent essay, Brian Gilmore examines recent calls for
an international “degrowth” movement—a campaign for
deliberate economic contraction in response to climate change.218
Gilmore first takes note of the tension between rich and poor
nations over climate mitigation and adaptation projects:
How can the historically developed nations of high
economic development now convince these
developing nations that they should halt or
significantly alter their economic development and
growth and not seek to change the standard of
living in their countries for the masses of people for
the sake of sustaining a world population that has
heretofore denied them participation? It is perhaps
an impossible suggestion.219
As Gilmore goes on to observe, however, the tension
between, on the one hand, the need to abandon economic
“business as usual” for the sake of the human race as a whole,
218.
See generally, Gilmore, supra note 151. In his essay, Gilmore
refers to Serge Latouche’s 2009 book, Farewell to Growth, which advocates for
“de-growth” but also calls for resistance to bias. Id. at 1286.
219.
Id. at 1284.
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and, on the other hand, the need to make recompense for the
continuing injuries of slavery, colonialism, imperialism and
discrimination is not only an international issue.220 Gilmore notes
that African Americans—who are still, as a population, near the
bottom of many U.S. measures of economic and social wellbeing—
have for years been promised “equal opportunity.”221 As the world
now possibly turns toward economic contraction, Gilmore asks
these questions:
What will “degrowth” mean for black Americans,
specifically beyond the individual choice or
collective choice?
Will it mean equality or will it mean a transition to
a “degrowth” society, where the same enduring
inequities persist?
How will the transition from an unequal “growth”
society be made and how will it be implemented?
Are past injustices, such as slavery and “Jim Crow”
laws, to be forgotten or dismissed for all times in
light of “degrowth”?
Is there any need to address these past injustices
considering the goals of “degrowth”?
What will guarantee more equality as the transition
or semi-transition occurs?
And will the implementation of “degrowth” models
imperil personal freedoms of black Americans? 222
Fineman’s theory of vulnerability raises these same
questions. This Article has argued that vulnerability theory offers
220.
See id. at 1283–85 (applying the degrowth tensions to the
United States).
221.
See id. at 1288–93 (discussing the history of slavery and
measures of present-day economic inequality, including the racialized wealth
gap).
222.
Id. at 1293.
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a way into rethinking political obligation in the age of the
Anthropocene, by situating the human social contract within a
“natural contract” that is trans-human but also constitutive of
the human. Ecological vulnerability brings into political theory
recognition of the full extent of human “fragile materiality,” and
underscores the fact of the indivisibility of human flourishing and
ecological balance.
At the same time, vulnerability theory alone is insufficient
to completely fulfill the promise of this mutual engagement
between critical legal theory and environmental theory.
Vulnerability is a universal condition of being human, but it does
not burden all equally. Fineman’s notion of vulnerability rightly
calls attention to the social institutions that mediate
vulnerability and support resilience. Yet, attention to universal
vulnerability can too easily become a means of ignoring specific
injustices. A robust commitment to anti-subordination as well as
indivisibility is required to truly incorporate social justice and
environmental care. Together, the two principles can begin to
assist us in responding to the challenges of the Anthropocene.

